The Foreign Emoluments Clause — Where the Bodies Are Buried: 'Idiosyncratic' Legal Positions by Tillman, Seth Barrett
TILLMAN STCL 2018 237-279_TILLMAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/10/2018 1:40 PM 
 
237 
THE FOREIGN EMOLUMENTS CLAUSE—WHERE THE 
BODIES ARE BURIED: “IDIOSYNCRATIC” LEGAL 
POSITIONS* 
SETH BARRETT TILLMAN† 
I.  INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 238 
II.    PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS AND THE BRIEF OF THE LEGAL 
HISTORIANS .................................................................................... 242 
III.  THE AFTERMATH OF THE HAMILTON DOCUMENTS IMBROGLIO: 
MIKE STERN’S “NATIONAL TREASURE ORIGINALISM” ................. 252 
IV.     PROFESSOR VICTORIA F. NOURSE AND THE ABYSS ...................... 262 
V.  THE WAY FORWARD ...................................................................... 275 
 
* A draft version of Part III, absent footnotes, appeared on The Originalism Blog. 
† Lecturer, Maynooth University Department of Law. Roinn Dlí Ollscoil Mhá Nuad. I thank 
Professor Josh Blackman and the student editors at South Texas Law Review for the opportunity to 
present my preliminary thoughts at their September 8, 2017 symposium on the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause. In addition to my academic and popular, print and online, publications, I 
have filed several briefs in the three federal district court actions—one of which is now on appeal. 
See, e.g., Brief of Scholar Seth Barrett Tillman & the Judicial Education Project as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Appellee and Affirmance, Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 
No. 18-0474-cv (2d Cir. June 5, 2018), ECF No. 135, 2018 WL 2722468; Corrected Response of 
Scholar Seth Barrett Tillman & the Judicial Education Project as Amici Curiae in Support of the 
Defendant, District of Columbia & Maryland v. Trump, No. 8:17-cv-01596-PJM (D. Md. Dec. 31, 
2017), ECF No. 77, 2017 WL 6880026; Motion and Brief for Scholar Seth Barrett Tillman & the 
Judicial Education Project as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendant, District of Columbia & 
Maryland v. Trump, No. 8:17-cv-01596-PJM (D. Md. Oct. 6, 2017), ECF No. 27-1, 2017 WL 
4685826; Brief for Scholar Seth Barrett Tillman & the Judicial Education Project as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Defendant, Blumenthal v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-01154 (D.D.C. Sept. 19, 2017), ECF 
No. 16-1, 2017 WL 4230605; Amicus Curiae Scholar Seth Barrett Tillman’s & Proposed Amicus 
Curiae Judicial Education Project’s Response to Amici Curiae by Certain Legal Historians, 
Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 
2017), ECF No. 85-1, 2017 WL 4685886; Motion and Brief for Scholar Seth Barrett Tillman as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendant, Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 
276 F. Supp. 3d 174 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2017), ECF No. 37, 2017 WL 2692500. My publications 
can be found on Westlaw, LexisNexis, HeinOnline, and on the Social Science Research Network. 
See Scholarly Papers [of Seth Barrett Tillman], SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK (last 
visited Jan. 7, 2018), https://ssrn.com/author=345891; see also Selected Works of Seth Barrett 
Tillman, BEPRESS (last visited Jan. 7, 2018), https://works.bepress.com/seth_barrett_tillman/. Feel 
free to contact me if you have any difficulty finding Tillman-authored materials. 
sbarrettillman@yahoo.com, @SethBTillman. 
TILLMAN STCL 2018 237-279_TILLMAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/10/2018  1:40 PM 
238 SOUTH TEXAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:237 
I. INTRODUCTION  
In 2017, three sets of plaintiffs in three different federal district courts 
brought civil actions against the President of the United States: each action 
alleged that the President has and continues to violate the Constitution’s 
Foreign Emoluments Clause.
1
 The Foreign Emoluments Clause provides: 
No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no 
Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, 
without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, 
Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, 
Prince, or foreign State.
2
 
There are only a handful of federal cases discussing the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause.
3
 Not one of these cases has any extensive discussion 
of the scope of the Foreign Emoluments Clause or the scope of the clause’s 
Office of Profit or Trust under the United States language (“Office-
 
 1. See, e.g., Amended Complaint, District of Columbia & Maryland v. Trump, No. 8:17-
cv-01596-PJM (D. Md. Feb. 23, 2018), ECF No. 90-2, 2018 WL 1051866, amending Complaint, 
District of Columbia & Maryland v. Trump, No. 8:17-cv-01596-PJM (D. Md. June 12, 2017), 
ECF No. 1, 2017 WL 2559732 (motion to dismiss briefing and oral argument was based on the 
original complaint); First Amended Complaint, Blumenthal v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-01154-EGS 
(D.D.C. Aug. 15, 2017), ECF No. 14, 2017 WL 7355132; Second Amended Complaint, Citizens 
for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174 (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2017) 
(No. 1:17-cv-00458-RA), ECF No. 28, 2017 WL 2734681 [hereinafter Second Amended 
Complaint, CREW v. Trump] (CREW v. Trump was subsequently transferred from Judge Abrams 
to Judge Daniels). Each case brings a claim based on the Foreign Emoluments Clause. See U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8. But only CREW v. Trump and District of Columbia. & Maryland v. 
Trump bring a claim based on the Domestic Emoluments Clause (a/k/a Presidential Compensation 
Clause or Presidential Emoluments Clause). See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7. Detailed discussion 
of that second cause of action and constitutional provision is beyond the scope of this Article. 
Many of the documents (including pleadings and briefs) related to these cases can be found on the 
websites of litigators associated with the plaintiffs in these matters. See Emoluments Clause 
Litigation, GUPTA WESSLER, P.L.L.C. (last visited Mar. 26, 2018), 
http://guptawessler.com/emoluments/; Rule of Law: Blumenthal, et al. v. Trump, Holding 
President Trump Accountable for His Violations of the Foreign Emoluments Clause, 
CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY CTR. (last visited Mar. 26, 2018), 
https://www.theusconstitution.org/litigation/trump-and-foreign-emoluments-clause/. These 
websites would be more helpful to interested third-parties if they were complete. Regrettably, my 
amicus briefs in District of Columbia & Maryland v. Trump and Blumenthal v. Trump are not 
listed, or if listed, are listed absent links. Likewise, some Department of Justice briefs are not 
listed, or if listed, are listed absent links. No doubt, this was all an oversight. See generally Seth 
Barrett Tillman, A Work in Progress: Select Bibliography of Court Filings and Other Sources 
Regarding the Foreign and Domestic Emoluments Clauses Cases, NEW REFORM CLUB (Feb. 28, 
2018, 8:59 AM), https://reformclub.blogspot.com/2018/02/a-work-in-progress-select-
bibliography.html [hereinafter A Work in Progress]. 
 2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (emphasis added).  
 3. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 424 n.51 (2010) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting the Foreign Emoluments Clause); United States ex rel. Newdow 
v. Rumsfeld, 448 F.3d 403, 410 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (discussing the Foreign Emoluments Clause).  
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language” or “Office . . . under the United States-language”). Not one of 
these cases, expressly or impliedly, affirms or denies that the clause applies 
to the President. Likewise, there is no decision by any court of record—of 
which I am aware—which affirms or denies that the clause’s Office-
language, or closely similar language in any other constitutional provision, 
encompasses the presidency. If the courts were to reach the merits,
4
 the 
issue at hand, the scope of the clause’s Office-language, is entirely one of 
first impression. Still, there has been some discussion of the clause and its 
Office-language, primarily, but not exclusively, amongst academics. Such 
discussion has appeared in the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal 
Counsel memoranda, academic articles, popular magazines focusing on 
news, politics, and law, and in amicus briefs. 
Since 2008, I have argued in multiple publications that the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause’s Office-language, and closely similar language in 
other constitutional provisions, reaches only appointed federal officers, and 
not any elected federal officials, including the presidency.
5
 My position has 
not gone entirely unnoticed; indeed, it has even occasioned some firm and 
thoughtful opposition.
6
 My goal in this Article is not to illustrate the full 
 
 4. If one of the Foreign Emoluments Clause cases is dismissed on a traditional threshold 
issue, e.g., standing or justiciability, a court is less likely to address the scope of the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause’s Office-language. See, e.g., Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. 
Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174, 195 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2017), appeal docketed, No 18-474 (2d 
Cir. Feb. 16, 2018) [hereinafter CREW v. Trump] (“Because Plaintiffs’ claims are dismissed 
under Rule 12(b)(1), this Court does not reach the issue of whether Plaintiffs’ allegations state a 
cause of action under either the Domestic or Foreign Emoluments Clauses, pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(6).”). But see generally District of Columbia & Maryland v. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d 725 
(D. Md. Mar. 28 2018) (finding plaintiffs have standing, but refraining from ruling on other 
threshold questions, and so not granting discovery at this juncture). It might be argued that the 
scope of the Foreign Emoluments Clause’s Office-language is akin to personal jurisdiction, and so 
a threshold issue, rather than a merits question.  
 5. My earliest publications on the subject include: Seth Barrett Tillman & Steven G. 
Calabresi, The Great Divorce: The Current Understanding of Separation of Powers and the 
Original Meaning of the Incompatibility Clause, 157 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 134, 135–40, 
146–53 (2008). Compare Seth Barrett Tillman, Why Our Next President May Keep His or Her 
Senate Seat: A Conjecture on the Constitution’s Incompatibility Clause, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 1 (2009), with Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Why the Incompatibility 
Clause Applies to the Office of the President, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 35 
(2009).  
 6. Compare, e.g., Zephyr Teachout, Gifts, Offices, and Corruption, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 
COLLOQUY 30 (2012) [hereinafter Teachout, Gifts, Offices, and Corruption], and Zephyr 
Teachout, Constitutional Purpose and the Anti-Corruption Principle, 108 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 
200 (2014), with Seth Barrett Tillman, Citizens United and the Scope of Professor Teachout’s 
Anti-Corruption Principle, 107 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 1 (2012) [hereinafter Tillman, 
Citizens United and the Scope of Professor Teachout’s Anti-Corruption Principle], and Seth 
Barrett Tillman, The Original Public Meaning of the Foreign Emoluments Clause: A Reply to 
Professor Zephyr Teachout, 107 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 180 (2013) [hereinafter Tillman, The 
Original Public Meaning of the Foreign Emoluments Clause]; compare, e.g., Zephyr Teachout & 
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spectrum of views opposing my position on the subject. There are far too 
many such views—many of which contradict one another, and many of 
which do not appear to have gone through any sort of independent review 
process, by student editors, peer review, or otherwise.
7
 Instead, my more 
 
Seth Barrett Tillman, Common Interpretation, The Foreign Emoluments Clause: Article I, Section 
9, Clause 8, NAT’L CONSTITUTION CTR. (last visited Mar. 26, 2018), 
https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/articles/article-i/the-foreign-emoluments-
clause-article-i-section-9-clause-8/clause/34 [hereinafter Common Interpretation, The Foreign 
Emoluments Clause], with Zephyr Teachout, Matter of Debate, The Foreign Emoluments Clause, 
NAT’L CONSTITUTION CTR., https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/articles/article-
i/the-foreign-emoluments-clause-by-zephyr-teachout/clause/34, with Seth Barrett Tillman, Matter 
of Debate, The Foreign Emoluments Clause Reached Only Appointed Officers, NAT’L 
CONSTITUTION CTR., https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/articles/article-i/the-
foreign-emoluments-clause-reached-only-appointed-officers/clause/34; compare, e.g., Zephyr 
Teachout, Room for Debate, Trump’s Foreign Business Ties May Violate the Constitution, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 17, 2016, 5:06 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/11/17/would-
trumps-foreign-business-ties-be-constitutional/trumps-foreign-business-ties-may-violate-the-
constitution, with Seth Barrett Tillman, Room for Debate, Constitutional Restrictions on Foreign 




eft&pgtype=blogs. See generally, e.g., Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 
CORNELL L. REV. 341 (2009). 
 7. See, e.g., Norman L. Eisen et al., The Emoluments Clause: Its Text, Meaning, and 
Application to Donald J. Trump, GOVERNANCE STUDIES AT BROOKINGS 9 n.32 (Dec. 16, 2016), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/gs_121616_emoluments-clause1.pdf 
(citing Tillman disapprovingly). It is possible that all Brookings publications (including this one) 
go through some sort of internal review—I see no indication of any such review noted in the 
publication itself. There are other such recent publications which argue that the President is 
covered by the Foreign Emoluments Clause. These papers do not cite my publications (or me), nor 
have they gone through (as far as I can tell) any sort of independent review. See, e.g., Joshua Matz 
& Laurence H. Tribe, President Trump Has No Defense Under the Foreign Emoluments Clause, 
ACSBLOG (Jan. 24, 2017), 
https://acslaw.org/sites/default/files/pdf/Trump%20and%20the%20Emoluments%20Clause.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R4TA-BMSY]; Laurence H. Tribe et al., The Courts and the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause, CASETEXT (Jan. 30, 2017), https://casetext.com/posts/the-courts-and-the-
foreign-emoluments-clause-1 [https://perma.cc/G2LX-BD5B]; The Text and History of the 
Foreign Emoluments Clause, CONST. ACCOUNTABILITY CTR. (last visited Feb. 4, 2018), 
https://www.theusconstitution.org/think_tank/the-text-and-history-of-the-foreign-emoluments-
clause/; see also, e.g., Jonathan Hennessey, Reconstituting: The U.S. Constitution’s Emoluments 
Clause and Donald Trump—Full Documentary, JONATHAN HENNESSEY (July 24, 2017), 
http://www.jonathanhennessey.com/documentary-donald-trump-emoluments/ (“30:04–48:00 
Explaining and refuting Seth Barrett Tillman’s case that the Foreign Emoluments Clause does not 
apply to the president.”); John Mikhail, The Definition of “Emolument” in English Language and 
Legal Dictionaries, 1523–1806 (July 1, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2995693 [hereinafter 
Mikhail, Definition of Emolument] (citing two Tillman-authored publications). Mikhail’s article is 
a serious publication, but there is no information posted on the Social Science Research Network 
indicating that Mikhail’s article (which is now over a year old) has been accepted for publication 
by any journal of any sort. Id. Moreover, notwithstanding that these publications have not gone 
through any sort of independent review, some of the authors of these publications cite their own 
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modest goal here is to illustrate how deeply idiosyncratic
8
 some of these 
views are—not merely in their conclusions, but more importantly in their 
broad methodological approach. 
 
publications in court filings in which they are acting as attorneys (or “clients” in the amicus 
context). See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae by Certain Legal Historians on Behalf of Plaintiffs at 3 
n.10, Blumenthal v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-01154-EGS (D.D.C. Nov. 2, 2017), ECF No. 26-1, 2017 
WL 5513219 [hereinafter Legal Historians Brief (DC)] (citing Mikhail, Definition of Emolument, 
supra); Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (NY) at 58, 
Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 
2017), ECF No. 57, 2017 WL 3444116 (citing Tribe, supra); Second Amended Complaint, 
CREW v. Trump, supra note 1, at 2 n.1 (citing Eisen et al., supra). Amongst this entire group of 
academics and litigators listed in this footnote, it appears that the only person who had published 
on the Foreign Emoluments Clause prior to the election of President Trump was Richard Painter. 
He wrote two pages on the clause. See, e.g., RICHARD W. PAINTER, TAXATION ONLY WITH 
REPRESENTATION 107 (2016) (“The Emoluments Clause does curtail some avenues of foreign 
influence, but its reach is limited.”); id. at 120.  
 8. One should not be so thin-skinned as to imagine that “idiosyncratic” or other similar 
language is a mean-spirited expression rooted in sarcasm, contempt, or derision. It is a perfectly 
acceptable term, which might fairly apply to all interpretations, including my own, not well 
grounded in Supreme Court and other federal court case law. See, e.g., Memorandum of Law in 
Support of Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 33 n. 20, District of Columbia & 
Maryland v. Trump, No. 8:17-cv-01596-PJM (D. Md. Nov. 7, 2017), ECF No. 46, 2017 WL 
5598183 (characterizing Tillman’s amicus brief as “idiosyncratic”); Eisen et. al., supra note 7, at 9 
n.32 (denominating Tillman’s position as “idiosyncratic,” “myopic,” and “strained”); Gautham 
Rao & Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Presidential Revisionism: The New York Times Published 
the Flimsiest Defense of Trump’s Apparent Emoluments Violations Yet, SLATE (July 17, 2017, 
5:42 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/07/the_new_york_times_pub
lished_the_flimsiest_defense_of_trump_s_apparent_emoluments.html (using, in its title, 
“flimsiest” in characterizing Blackman and Tillman’s position—albeit titles are customarily 
chosen by editors, not contributors); id. (making arguments about the 1793 Hamilton-signed roll 
of officers, which Professors Rao and Shugerman subsequently retracted in other fora, but, for 
whatever reason, no such retraction, even as a letter to the editor, appears on Slate); Deepak Gupta 
(@deepakguptalaw), TWITTER (Aug. 1, 2017, 10:58 AM), 
https://twitter.com/deepakguptalaw/status/892444459157381120 (“More evidence—and visit to 
National Archives—further discredits idiosyncratic view that President is immune from Foreign 
Emoluments Clause”); Mark Joseph Stern (@mjs_DC), TWITTER (Jan. 3, 2017, 11:48 AM), 
https://twitter.com/mjs_DC/status/816370577804054529 [https://perma.cc/7ZUY-6DK7] 
(“Conservative professors, seizing on a 1974 Scalia memo, are arguing that the [Foreign] 
Emoluments Clause doesn’t apply to the president. Nonsense.”); Mark Joseph Stern (@mjs_DC), 
TWITTER (Jan. 3, 2017, 12:00 PM), https://twitter.com/mjs_DC/status/816373583073054721 
[https://perma.cc/X9GF-LN3G] (“Maybe you’re right; I just find the argument so gobsmackingly 
bad that I can’t think of another explanation [other than politics].”); see also, e.g., Brief of 
Separation of Powers Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs at 16 n.9, Blumenthal v. 
Trump, No. 1:17-cv-01154-EGS (D.D.C. Nov. 2, 2017), ECF No. 25-1, 2017 WL 5513218 
(“Defendant [Tillman’s] Amicus’s arguments hold no water.”); Brief of Amicus Curiae by Certain 
Legal Historians on Behalf of Plaintiffs at 22, Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. 
Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2017), ECF No. 70-1, 2017 WL 5483629 (“But 
[Tillman’s] interpretation of the clause does not withstand scrutiny.”) [hereinafter Legal 
Historians Brief (NY)]; Plaintiff’s [CREW’s] Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion 
to Dismiss, supra note 7, at 31 n.18 (noting that “an amicus advances the idiosyncratic argument 
that the president is not subject to the Foreign Emoluments Clause”).  
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II. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS AND THE BRIEF OF THE LEGAL HISTORIANS 
The first filed of the three Foreign Emoluments Clause cases was 
Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (“CREW”) v. Trump.9 
Five academics (the “Legal Historians”)10 filed an amicus brief (the “Legal 
Historians Brief”)11 in support of the plaintiffs. The Legal Historians Brief 
 
 9. Complaint, Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 
174 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2017), ECF No. 1, 2017 WL 277603 [hereinafter Complaint, CREW v. 
Trump]. The operative complaint, the Second Amended Complaint, was filed on May 10, 2017, at 
docket number 28. See Second Amended Complaint, CREW v. Trump, supra note 1.  
 10. The authors (or clients) of the Legal Historians Brief are Professor Jack N. Rakove 
(Stanford University), Professor Jed Handelsman Shugerman (Fordham University School of 
Law), Professor John Mikhail (Georgetown University Law Center), Professor Gautham Rao 
(American University), and finally Professor Simon Stern (University of Toronto, Faculty of 
Law), who has blocked me from reading his Twitter feed. In addition to the Legal Historians Brief 
(NY), supra note 8, at 26–27, the same five academics on that brief also filed amicus briefs in the 
other two Foreign Emoluments Clause cases. See Brief of Amici Curiae by Certain Legal 
Historians on Behalf of Plaintiffs at 29, District of Columbia & Maryland v. Trump, No. 8:17-cv-
01596-PJM (D. Md. Nov. 14, 2017), ECF No. 58-1, 2017 WL 5624876 [hereinafter Legal 
Historians Brief (Maryland)]; Legal Historians Brief (DC), supra note 7, at 26.  
 11. See Legal Historians Brief (NY), supra note 8. In the course of this brief, certain very 
regrettable claims were made—albeit, not by my counsel or by me. Id. at 22 n.82. These claims 
were subsequently retracted by the Legal Historians in a letter to the Court and on Balkinization, a 
well-read legal blog. See Letter from Daniel J. Walker, Counsel for the Legal Historians, to Judge 
George B. Daniels, U.S. District Court Judge (Oct. 3, 2017) [hereinafter Letter to Judge Daniels]; 
John Mikhail, Our Correction and Apology to Professor Tillman, BALKINIZATION (Oct. 3, 2017, 
8:30 PM), https://balkin.blogspot.ie/2017/10/our-correction-and-apology-to-professor.html 
[hereinafter, Mikhail, Our Correction and Apology to Professor Tillman]; see also Jed 
Shugerman, An Apology to Tillman and Blackman, TAKE CARE (Sept. 22, 2017), 
https://takecareblog.com/blog/an-apology-to-tillman-and-blackman [hereinafter Shugerman, An 
Apology to Tillman and Blackman]. In this Article, I have taken care not to criticize the Legal 
Historians Brief (and its authors) in relation to the position it (and they) put forward in that brief 
involving the authenticity of the signature of the original 1793 Hamilton-signed roll of officers 
and the purported signature in subsequent reproductions of that document. Other positions put 
forward by the Legal Historians, collectively and individually, in their brief and elsewhere, such 
as their position on presidential electors, must remain on the table for public discussion. It would 
be remiss for me to fail to note that for many, many years, I had hoped that all the documents 
relating to Hamilton’s 1793 roll of officers would become the subject of inquiry and discussion by 
other scholars. It is with genuine regret that my hopes were not realized along the lines I had 
sought. See supra note 8 (discussing Rao & Shugerman’s article on Slate). Recently, Professors 
Shugerman and Rao created a website archiving these documents. See THE FOREIGN 
EMOLUMENTS CLAUSE: EVIDENCE FROM THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES (last visited Feb. 25, 2018), 
https://sites.google.com/view/foreignemolumentsclause. They cited this website in their amicus 
brief and elsewhere. See Legal Historians Brief (NY), supra note 8, at 23 n.82; Jed Shugerman, 
Questions about the Emoluments Amicus Brief on Behalf of Trump, TAKE CARE (Aug. 31, 2017), 
https://takecareblog.com/blog/questions-about-the-emoluments-amicus-brief-on-behalf-of-trump 
(“Our colleague Rebecca Brenner followed up with her own visit [to the National Archives] and 
took photos of every document in the archival box. We posted them online here on a website to 
offer to the public images of all of the contents of the archival box.” (emphasis added)); Gautham 
Rao (@gauthamrao), TWITTER (Aug. 11, 2017, 2:11 PM), 
https://twitter.com/gauthamrao/status/896116983099400192 [https://perma.cc/CTD6-XNAR] 
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(“Some of our archival evidence for the Historians Brief can be seen here: 
http://sites.google.com/view/foreignemolumentsclause . . . (hat tip to @BrianneGorod too!)”) 
(reporting “likes” and/or “retweets” from Professors Shugerman and Mikhail). Again, it is with 
some regret that I report that this website is no longer active—my attempts to view it produce: 
“Google 404. That’s an error. The requested URL was not found on this server. That’s all we 
know.” (For an alternative website see A Work in Progress, supra note 1.) Whether the 
Shugerman-Rao website’s designers passively allowed it to go moribund, or purposely deactivated 
the website, I do not know—but I do know that an appeal in CREW v. Trump was filed on 
February 16, 2018. See supra note 4 (reporting subsequent history in CREW v. Trump). Yet, 
sources cited in the trial court record by the Legal Historians (who include academics both in law 
schools and in history departments) are already dissolving before our very eyes. E.g., Jed 
Shugerman, Questions about the Emoluments Amicus Brief on Behalf of Trump UPDATED, 
SHUGERBLOG (Aug. 31, 2017), https://shugerblog.com/2017/08/31/questions-about-the-
emoluments-amicus-brief-on-behalf-of-trump-and-its-use-and-misuse-of-historical-sources/ (“I’m 
not deleting this Aug. 31 [2017] post because it’s important to acknowledge my error, not to erase 
it.” (emphasis added)). I do not have to wonder what the response on social media and elsewhere 
would be if I had done (or allowed to have been done) such a thing; you—gentle reader—might 
consider the response if you had done (or allowed to have been done) such a thing. See, e.g., 
Brianne J. Gorod, What Alexander Hamilton Really Said, TAKE CARE (July 6, 2017), 
https://takecareblog.com/blog/what-alexander-hamilton-really-said [https://perma.cc/YCY8-
XQC9 (“[A]fter months of pretending like this document didn’t exist, [Tillman] finally 
acknowledged it—and was forced to describe it in grossly misleading terms in order to discount 
its significance.” (emphases added)); Joshua Matz, Foreign Emoluments, Alexander Hamilton & a 
Twitter Kerfuffle, TAKE CARE (July 12, 2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog/foreign-emoluments-
alexander-hamilton-and-a-twitter-kerfuffle [http://perma.cc/66Z7-VY76] (“It’s hardly an 
impressive defense to mislead so dramatically in the NYT but then say that it’s all okay, since a 
few years ago I had a footnote in a law review article alluding vaguely to this contrary material.” 
(emphasis added)); id. (noting that Tillman’s publications are “low-profile academic articles”); 
Mark Joseph Stern (@MJS_DC), TWITTER (Aug. 1, 2017, 11:36 
AM), https://twitter.com/mjs_DC/status/892454064532934658 [https://perma.cc/4DRT-
WD5G] (“@BrianneGorod went to the National Archives to debunk the claim that the 
Emoluments Clause doesn’t apply to Trump[.]” (emphasis added) (showing that the tweet was 
subsequently deleted with the link now indicating: “Sorry, that page doesn’t exist!”)); Laurence 
Tribe (@tribelaw), TWITTER (Sept. 1, 2017, 7:20 PM), 
https://twitter.com/tribelaw/status/903804726717841409 [https://perma.cc/GS65-VAYA] 
(“Another devastating critique of Tillmania by @jedshug[.]” (emphasis added)). Three of these 
four people are litigators in the Foreign Emoluments Clause cases against the President of the 
United States; the fourth, Stern, a journalist, is cheering on the other three. See, e.g., First 
Amended Complaint, Blumenthal v. Trump, supra note 1, at 57 (listing Brianne J. Gorod among 
the attorneys for plaintiffs); Plaintiff’s [CREW’s] Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s 
Motion to Dismiss, supra note 7, at 60 (listing Joshua Matz among the attorneys for plaintiffs); 
Second Amended Complaint, CREW v. Trump, supra note 1, at 66 (listing Professor Tribe among 
the attorneys for plaintiffs). It is possible that this sort of overreach is caused by participation in 
high-stakes litigation, and then finding out that someone you might otherwise respect is on the 
“other” side. Prior to the start of litigation, some demonstrated better behavior. See, e.g., Laurence 
Tribe (@tribelaw), TWITTER (Nov. 19, 2016, 6:38 PM), 
https://twitter.com/tribelaw/status/800166406897672192 [https://perma.cc/DS27-U2L9] (“Just 
wait, @kurteichenwald: Some kook will argue the Emoluments Clause doesn’t apply to the 
President. Ridiculous but predictable.”); Laurence Tribe (@tribelaw), TWITTER (Nov. 21, 2016, 
4:00 PM), https://twitter.com/tribelaw/status/800851329178566657 [https://perma.cc/7DQQ-
EVEU] (“Must apologize: turns out scholar @SethBTillman makes that argument carefully. He’s 
no kook, but I find the argument seriously unconvincing.”). Or, perhaps, such overreach is caused 
by commentators’ speaking without familiarizing themselves with—some or any of—the extant 
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stated: “As holders of an office ‘of trust’ under the United States, 
[presidential] electors [like the President] would also be subject to the 
[Foreign Emoluments] [C]lause.”12 
The Legal Historians’ claim regarding presidential electors is 
perplexing. They cite no authority for this position. The Legal Historians 
quote anti-federalist George Mason for the proposition that: “the electors in 
the states might also [like the President] ‘be easily influenced,’ . . . by 
foreign emoluments.”13 But Mason does not actually say presidential 
electors fall under the scope of the Foreign Emoluments Clause or its 
Office-language. The Legal Historians also quote Edmund Randolph, a 
mercurial figure who chose not to the sign the Constitution at the 
Philadelphia Convention, but argued for ratification at his state’s (i.e., 
Virginia’s) ratification convention. According to the Legal Historians, 
“Randolph argued that the requirement that electors be appointed separately 
in the states and have to vote on the same day ‘renders it unnecessary and 
impossible for foreign force or aid to interpose.’”14 If Mason’s language 
tends to suggest presidential electors fall under the aegis of the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause, Randolph’s statement suggests just the opposite. In 
any event, none of the language quoted appears to be direct or substantive 
evidence, even of the (weak) original public expectations variety, for the 
Legal Historians’ position.15 
 
literature. See Glenda Gilmore (@GilmoreGlenda), TWITTER (Aug. 31, 2017, 4:53 AM), 
https://twitter.com/GilmoreGlenda/status/903224236843704320 [https://perma.cc/53TX-VDJ5] 
(“Trump lawyers use 1 Hamilton letter for argument; bury 2nd Hamilton letter to the contrary 
written same day. Historians know better.” (emphasis added) (blocking Tillman from her Twitter 
feed thereafter)). Professor Gilmore is, I believe, a recently retired historian from Yale 
University’s Department of History. There are many other such examples. See Marc Johnson, 
Episode 8: Article 1, Section 9, Clause 8, MANY THINGS CONSIDERED (Jan. 18, 2017), 
http://manythingsconsidered.com/podcast (Dean Erwin Chemerinsky stating that the position that 
the President is not covered by the Foreign Emoluments Clause is “a silly argument”) (at 32:25ff). 
Dean Chemerinsky is also a litigator in the Foreign Emoluments Clause cases. See Second 
Amended Complaint, CREW v. Trump, supra note 1, at 66 (listing Dean Chemerinsky among the 
lawyers for plaintiffs). Think about the example Gilmore and Chemerinsky are setting for others, 
including their own students, particularly JD and PhD candidates—people who will emulate their 
behavior in academic and other professional settings.  
 12. See Legal Historians Brief (NY), supra note 8, at 17 n.59 (inner quotation marks are in 
the Legal Historians Brief (NY), which is, apparently, quoting the Constitution’s Foreign 
Emoluments Clause).  
 13. Id. at 17 (quoting 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION: VIRGINIA 1365–66 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1993)). The material in the inner 
quotation marks is a quotation from Mason. 
 14. Id. (quoting 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION: VIRGINIA, supra note 13, at 1367). The material in the inner quotation marks is a 
quotation from Randolph.  
 15. See Legal Historians Brief (Maryland), supra note 10, at 19–21 (discussing George 
Mason’s and Edmund Randolph’s expectations: i.e., the Foreign Emoluments Clause applied to 
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More troubling is that there is a substantial body of authority taking 
the position that presidential electors are state positions,
16
 not federal 
positions, and so entirely beyond the scope of the Foreign Emoluments 
Clause and its Office . . . under the United States-language.
17
 The Legal 
Historians did not discuss this line of authority. Furthermore, there is a 
more recent line of academic authority, initially put forward by Vasan 
 
the presidency); Legal Historians Brief (DC), supra note 7, at 16–18 (same); Legal Historians 
Brief (NY), supra note 8, at 17–18 (same); see also Legal Historians Brief (NY), supra note 8, at 
22 n.82 (“For contemporaneous evidence that the founders understood that the [Foreign 
Emoluments Clause] applied to the president, see the exchange between Mason and Randolph . . . 
.”); Jack M. Balkin, Text, Principle, and Living Constitutionalism, BALKINIZATION (May 20, 
2008, 1:57 PM), https://balkin.blogspot.ie/2008/05/text-principle-and-living.html (explaining that 
“central to my theory is the claim that we are not bound by the original expected application”). 
But see Letter to Judge Daniels, supra note 11 (withdrawing footnote 82 from the Legal Historians 
Brief). See generally Letter from Professor William Andreen et al. to Majority Leader Mitch 
McConnell et al., Re: President Obama’s Nomination of Judge Merrick Garland (Mar. 7, 2016), 
https://www.afj.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Law-professor-SCOTUS-vacancy-letter.pdf 
(“The Senate must not defeat the intention of the Framers by failing to perform its constitutional 
duty.” (emphasis added) (signed by Dean Chemerinsky and others)); but see generally Seth 
Barrett Tillman, The Two Discourses: How Non-Originalists Popularize Originalism and What 
That Means, NEW REFORM CLUB (Mar. 28, 2016, 9:22 AM), 
http://reformclub.blogspot.ie/2016/03/the-two-discourses-how-non-originalists.html (expressing 
doubts that Dean Chemerinsky and many of the other signatories to the McConnell letter are 
originalists of the original intent type—or any other type). 
 16. See, e.g., Walker v. United States, 93 F.2d 383, 388 (8th Cir. 1937) (“It is contended by 
defendants that presidential electors are officers of the state and not federal officers. We are of the 
view that this contention is sound and should be sustained.”); Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 904 
(D.C. Cir. 1975) (per curiam), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) 
(“[A] Presidential elector is a state officer, not a federal one.”) (citing In re Green, 134 U.S. 377, 
379 (1890)); Beverly J. Ross & William Josephson, The Electoral College and the Popular Vote, 
12 J.L. & POL’Y 665, 692 (1996) (“Relevant constitutional provisions imply that electors are state, 
not federal, officers.”); id. at 693–94 (collecting state court authority taking the position that 
electors are state officers); see also, e.g., In re Green, 134 U.S. 377, 379 (1890) (“Although the 
electors are appointed and act under and pursuant to the [C]onstitution of the United States, they 
are no more officers or agents of the United States than are the members of the state legislatures 
when acting as electors of federal [S]enators, or the people of the states when acting as electors of 
[R]epresentatives in [C]ongress.”); CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION: ANALYSIS OF CASES DECIDED BY THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES TO JUNE 28, 2012, S. DOC. NO. 112-9, at 475, 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CONAN-2012/pdf/GPO-CONAN-2012.pdf (“[I]n 
Ray v. Blair, the [Supreme] Court reasserted the conception of electors as state officers . . . .”) 
(citing Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214 (1952)). I take no position in regard to whether CRS correctly 
characterized Ray v. Blair.  
 17. See 4 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 651, at 577 (1906) 
(“The provisions of the Constitution ‘neither prevent nor authorize persons who may hold office 
under any one of the States from accepting an appointment under a foreign government.’” 
(quoting State Department correspondence from 1872)). But cf. Teachout, Gifts, Offices, and 
Corruption, supra note 6, at 37 (discussing the possibility that the Foreign Emoluments Clause 
might reach state officers, but conceding that such a view is probably not the “better reading”). 
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Kesavan, that notes that the Constitution’s Religious Test Clause18 
distinguishes offices under the United States from public trusts under the 
United States. Kesavan argues that the position of presidential elector, 
although a federal position, is a public trust under the United States, as 
opposed to an office under the United States.
19
 Again, this alternative view 
was not discussed by the Legal Historians. 
Failing to discuss academic authority and nonbinding federal case law 
is not best practice. But it is certainly within the norms of the legal 
profession, particularly in a brief where space is scarce.
20
 Failing to discuss 
contrary Supreme Court authority is another matter entirely. In 1867, in 
United States v. Hartwell,
21
 the Supreme Court held: “The term [‘office’] 
embraces the ideas of tenure, duration, emolument, and duties.”22 
Presidential electors fail each and every element of this four-factor test. 
Presidential electors do not have tenure in office: what the state legislature 
gives, the state legislature can take back (at least prior to the electors’ 
voting).
23
 The position of elector lacks duration: it exists only for a short 
 
 18. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (“[N]o religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification 
to any Office or public Trust under the United States.” (emphasis added)).  
 19. See Vasan Kesavan, The Very Faithless Elector, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 123, 133 & n.45 
(2001) (discussing “office” and “public trust” language in the Religious Test Clause); id. at 129 
(“Electors are—by definition—neither (1) ‘Senator[s] or Representative[s],’ nor (2) ‘Person[s] 
holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States.’”). But compare Jed Shugerman 
(@jedshug), TWITTER (May 30, 2017, 6:20 AM), 
https://twitter.com/jedshug/status/869543960905211904 [https://perma.cc/7X5H-77XQ] 
(“Foreign Emoluments clause applies to all offices of public trust, so would apply to TJ, Madison, 
Monroe[.]” (adding without explanation, the word “public” prior to “trust” or, perhaps, mistakenly 
converting the “or” in the Religious Test Clause’s language to an “of”)), with Marci A. Hamilton, 
The First Amendment’s Challenge Function and the Confusion in the Supreme Court’s 
Contemporary Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 29 GA. L. REV. 81, 97 n.55 (1994) (misquoting the 
Constitution’s Religious Test Clause as stating: “no religious test shall be required as a 
qualification to any office of public trust under the United States” where it should state “office or 
public trust”). For the reader who is interested in my view, I agree with Kesavan’s position: 
presidential electors—as a matter of original public meaning—hold an Article VI “public trust 
under the United States.” Albeit, there is federal case law to the contrary. See supra note 16. For 
my apologia for academics (and others, including presidents) who misquote the Constitution see 
Seth Barrett Tillman, Trump, Academia, and Hyperbole, NEW REFORM CLUB (Aug. 19, 2016, 
2:30 PM), http://reformclub.blogspot.ie/2016/08/trump-academia-and-hyperbole.html. 
 20. See, e.g., Matz, supra note 11 (“To be sure, there’s always a fine balance to be struck 
between scholarly nuance and word limits, especially in op-eds and works of legal advocacy. 
Many capable lawyers and legal scholars fail, at times, to reckon adequately with contrary 
precedents and primary sources.”). But see generally FED. R. EVID. 901 (requiring authentication 
or identification of evidence); FED. R. CIV. P. 44 (discussing authentication in regard to official 
records). 
 21. United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 385, 385 (1867).  
 22. Id. at 393 (emphasis added).  
 23. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (per curiam) (“The State, of course, after 
granting the franchise in the special context of Article II, can take back the power to appoint 
electors.”).  
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time—roughly, the time between the certification of the state general 
election ballot and the day the electors meet and vote. The position then 
ceases to exist for about 4 years—until the next presidential election cycle. 
The federal government does not pay presidential electors any 
compensation, i.e., the position comes with no federal emoluments (albeit, 
some states provide for travel and other expenses
24
). Presidential electors 
are best characterized as special federal agents (or holders of a “public trust 
under the United States”) with a single duty, i.e., to cast a ballot for 
President and Vice President.
25
 By contrast, a bona fide office, per 
Hartwell, must have duties, as opposed to a single duty. As the 
Congressional Research Service and the Library of Congress have opined 
since (at least) 2013: “The truth of the matter is that the electors are not 
‘officers’ at all, by the usual tests of office. They have neither tenure nor 
salary, and having performed their single function they cease to exist as 
electors.”26 Prior to the start of the Foreign Emoluments Clause cases 
against President Trump, none of this was considered controversial in any 
way. 
Let’s clarify: If presidential electors are state positions, then the Legal 
Historians Brief erred. If presidential electors hold Article VI public trusts 
under the United States, as opposed to Article VI offices under the United 
States, then the Legal Historians Brief erred. If, per Hartwell, presidential 
electors do not hold “office” of any type, then it would seem to follow that 
electors do not hold an Office . . . under the United States, and are, 
therefore, beyond the ambit of the Constitution’s Foreign Emoluments 
Clause and its Office . . . under the United States-language—and, again, the 
Legal Historians Brief erred. It is true that historical context matters, but 
legal context is an element, a very substantial element, of historical 
context.
27
 To be clear, my point is not that because the Legal Historians 
were wrong (and I do think they were wrong) about presidential electors 
being officers under the United States, then they must also be wrong about 
 
 24. Cf., e.g., Satrucharla Chandrasekhar Raju v. Vyricherla Pradeep Kumar Dev, A.I.R. 
1992 S.C. 1959, para. 7 (India), https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1633748/ (explaining that in 
determining if a position is an office of profit under the government of India, the court examines, 
among other factors, if the post is “paid out of the revenues of [the] Government of India”). 
 25. See In re Green, 134 U.S. 377, 379 (1890) (“The sole function of the presidential 
electors is to cast, certify and transmit the vote of the State for President and Vice President of the 
nation.” (emphasis added)).  
 26. S. DOC. NO. 112-9, supra note 16, at 474 (citing Hartwell, 73 U.S. at 393).  
 27. See, e.g., Legal Historians Brief (NY), supra note 8, at 24 n.86 (“[W]e caution against a 
narrowly linguistic approach to original public meaning if it ignores the historians’ commitment to 
understanding the political and intellectual contexts of constitutional debate. For sophisticated 
discussions of these methodological questions, see Jack N. Rakove . . . .”); see also, e.g., Legal 
Historians Brief (Maryland), supra note 10, at 24 n.72 (same); Legal Historians Brief (DC), supra 
note 7, at 22 n.64 (same).  
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the President’s being an officer under the United States. Instead, the 
methodological point here is that the Legal Historians’ (and others’) focus 
on the Foreign Emoluments Clause’s abstract purpose does not tell the 
interpreter if both of these positions (i.e., the presidency and presidential 
electors), if only one of these two positions, or if neither of these two 
positions are officers under the United States. A focus on purpose provides 
little guidance about the precise scope of the clause’s Office-language. At 
best, purpose might guide us as a tiebreaker or in a close situation. But with 
regard to presidential electors, in my opinion, it is not close, and so abstract 
purpose teaches us very little. Professor Zephyr Teachout is an Office-
maximalist, i.e., one who ascribes a wide (if not the widest) meaning to the 
Constitution’s divergent Office-language. But, as far as I know, even 
Teachout has never argued that presidential electors hold Office . . . under 
the United States.
28
 Her intellectual caution is an example others should 
emulate. 
Given all that, I pose the question: How could five academics tell a 
federal court, without citing any supporting authority or noting any contrary 
authority,
29
 that presidential electors hold an “office ‘of trust’ under the 





 28. See Seth Barrett Tillman, Originalism & The Scope of the Constitution’s 
Disqualification Clause, 33 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 59, 68–71 (2014) (describing the maximalist 
view) [hereinafter Tillman, Originalism & The Scope of the Constitution’s Disqualification 
Clause]. 
 29. See Matz, supra note 20 (discussing the lawyer’s duty to “reckon adequately with 
contrary” authority). Matz was speaking generally in regard to “contrary precedents;” here, by 
contrast, we are considering (what I would characterize as): [i] contrary [ii] binding [iii] 
controlling [iv] Supreme Court precedent. Just to be clear, my larger point is not that those 
involved in the Legal Historians Brief (NY) knew about United States v. Hartwell, thought it 
contrary, binding, and controlling, and failed to disclose what they knew. Rather, my point is that 
they might never have heard or considered Hartwell at all, and so were in no position to offer the 
federal trial court well informed friend-of-the-court guidance about the status of presidential 
electors and other positions ostensibly subject to the Constitution’s Foreign Emoluments Clause 
and its Office-language. See supra note 27 (quoting the Legal Historians’ repeated guidance in 
regard to “context”). 
 30. See supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text. The Legal Historians made this claim 
only in their amicus brief in CREW v. Trump. They filed that brief on August 11, 2017. See Legal 
Historians Brief (NY), supra note 8, at 17 n.59. They filed similar amicus briefs in Blumenthal v. 
Trump, filed on November 2, 2017, and in District of Columbia & Maryland v. Trump, filed on 
November 14, 2017, but their expansive claim about presidential electors was dropped. See Legal 
Historians Brief (DC), supra note 7, at 17 n.50; Legal Historians Brief (Maryland), supra note 10, 
at 20 n.58. Why this claim was made in August, but was gone by November, is unclear. I presume 
that the Legal Historians do not see Hartwell as contrary, binding, and controlling precedent, as 
they never communicated with Judge Daniels and retracted the claim that they had made about 
electors in their Southern District of New York amicus brief. See Seth Barrett Tillman 
(@sethbtillman), TWITTER (Oct. 26, 2017, 11:57 PM), 
https://twitter.com/SethBTillman/status/923805904486785024 [https://perma.cc/Y3BR-SVU6] 
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Here, I can only hypothesize. The Legal Historians are not particularly 
interested in the linguistic or genealogical history of the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause’s controlling phraseology: Office of Profit or Trust 
under [the United States]. Perhaps, they believe that such meaning never 
existed, or that it cannot now be rediscovered and reclaimed through 
modern research. Rather, their focus is on the historical purpose of the 
clause, which was (as all accept) an anti-corruption provision. Their 
thinking is (I hypothesize) if the clause were meant to apply to some federal 
positions, as it plainly was, then it is obvious that it was meant to apply to 
the most important positions,
31
 and that would include (among others) the 
presidency. And if the clause’s Office-language applied to the presidency, it 





(“Congressional Research Service: ‘The truth of the matter is that the electors are not “officers” at 
all, by the usual tests of office.’ citing U.S. v. Hartwell (1868)”). Compare Seth Barrett Tillman 
(@sethbtillman), TWITTER (Nov. 14, 2017, 4:43 AM), 
https://twitter.com/SethBTillman/status/930415788321886208 [https://perma.cc/98A6-KJQL] 
(“Congressional Research Service: ‘The truth of the matter is that the electors are not “officers” at 
all ….’ (citing U.S. v. Hartwell (1868)), https://www.congress.gov/content/conan/pdf/GPO-
CONAN-2017-9-3.pdf”), with Gautham Rao (@gauthamrao), TWITTER (Nov. 14, 2017, 5:09 
AM), https://twitter.com/gauthamrao/status/930422432682397697 [https://perma.cc/V2KH-
RANT] (“This [discussion of presidential electors] is all very interesting. Thank you. We deeply 
respect your scholarship and look forward to discussing your critiques as we work on future briefs 
and scholarship.”) (reporting a “like” from Professor Shugerman), with Seth Barrett Tillman 
(@sethbtillman), TWITTER (Nov. 14, 2017, 5:42 AM), 
https://twitter.com/SethBTillman/status/930430714251800576 [https://perma.cc/L2MD-3PWR] 
(“That’s not exactly publicly reaffirming the correctness of your submission to the SDNY court. If 
you stand by your statement, that’s fine. But if you do not, if it is plainly inconsistent with 
Hartwell, binding Supreme C[our]t precedent, then don’t you think you should do something?”), 
with Gautham Rao (@gauthamrao), TWITTER (Nov. 14, 2017, 7:13 AM), 
https://twitter.com/gauthamrao/status/930453706784559105 [https://perma.cc/WU3P-BAY4] 
(“We’re grateful for your continued engagement on this, and I’m sure it will be on our docket as 
we continue to work on future briefs etc.”) (reporting, again, a “like” from Professor Shugerman). 
See generally Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174, 179 
n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2017), appeal docketed, No 18-474 (2d Cir. Feb. 16, 2018) (dismissing 
case on standing grounds—a month after the Tillman-Rao-Shugerman exchange on Twitter).  
 31. See Johnson, Episode 8: Article 1, Section 9, Clause 8, supra note 11 (Dean 
Chemerinsky states that the Framers/ratifiers/framing-era public “above all . . . would [have] 
want[ed] to make sure that the President and Vice President were not influenced by foreign 
governments.”) (at 32:58ff). I might respond that the President and Vice President are not 
expressly listed under the Foreign Emoluments Clause. By contrast, the Impeachment Clause 
expressly lists the President and Vice President. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (“The President, Vice 
President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on 
Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors.”).  
 32. One really wonders how far the Legal Historians would embrace their chain of 
reasoning. If electors hold office under the United States because they elect the President (who, 
according to the Legal Historians, also holds an office under the United States), then do the voters 
(or members of the state legislatures) also hold office under the United States because the voters 
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The Legal Historians’ mistake, in my view, is to allow abstract 
purpose determine linguistic meaning as opposed to actual text in its 
contemporaneous historical legal context. When one attempts to reconstruct 
the historical purpose of a constitutional provision, as understood by the 
ratifying generation, there is no good reason to think that one will arrive at 
the right level of generality or abstraction which accords with the actual 
language chosen. This is particularly true where chosen language is 
technical
33




(or members) elect the electors (and, therefore, indirectly elect the President)? See, e.g., In re 
Green, 134 U.S. 377, 379 (1890) (“Although the electors are appointed and act under and pursuant 
to the [C]onstitution of the United States, they are no more officers or agents of the United States 
than are the members of the state legislatures when acting as electors of federal [S]enators, or the 
people of the states when acting as electors of [R]epresentatives in [C]ongress.”). 
 33. The Legal Historians expressly claim that electors hold an “office ‘of trust’ under the 
United States,” as opposed to an office of profit under the United States. See Legal Historians 
Brief (NY), supra note 8, at 23 (quoting the Constitution’s Foreign Emoluments Clause); see also 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7 (referring to “Office[s] of honor . . . under the United States”). In 
other words, it appears that the Legal Historians have conceded that the words used in the clause 
have a technical meaning, quite apart from any general or abstract discussion of purpose. See infra 
note 34 (discussing meaning connected to compromise). In such circumstances, the search for 
meaning requires our looking to how such language was used among participants within the legal 
system (contemporaneous with ratification), in addition to or as an important component of the 
greater general public. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 391 (1798) (explaining that 
“expressions” which are “technical” and “in use long before the Revolution . . . acquire[] an 
appropriate meaning, by Legislators, Lawyers, and Authors” (emphases in the original)); see also, 
e.g., Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 34 n.24, 
Blumenthal v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-01154-EGS (D.D.C. Oct. 26, 2017), ECF No. 17, 2017 WL 
5485653 (“Of course, the [Foreign Emoluments] Clause’s scope is limited by factors beyond the 
meaning of ‘emolument,’ such as the requirement that an officeholder ‘accept’ an emolument 
‘from’ a foreign state. This means that certain benefits which might fit within the broadest 
definition of emolument . . . are nevertheless outside the Clause’s scope, because they cannot be 
‘accepted’ or are not ‘from’ a foreign state.” (citing James Cleith Phillips & Sara White, The 
Meaning of the Three Emoluments Clauses in the U.S. Constitution: A Corpus Linguistic Analysis 
of American English, 1760–1799, 59 S. TEX. L. REV. 181 (2018))).  
 34. The progenitor clause of the Constitution’s Foreign Emoluments Clause was Article VI 
of the Articles of Confederation. Article VI of the Articles of Confederation stated: “[N]or shall 
any person holding any office of profit or trust under the United States, or any of them [i.e., any 
State], accept of any present, emolument, office or title of any kind whatever, from any King, 
Prince or foreign State . . . .” ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. VI, para. 1. Article VI 
became the Constitution’s Foreign Emoluments Clause, except Article VI’s language relating to 
state positions was dropped. See Tillman, Citizens United and the Scope of Professor Teachout’s 
Anti-Corruption Principle, supra note 6, at 5; Tillman, The Original Public Meaning of the 
Foreign Emoluments Clause, supra note 6, at 195–98; see also MOORE, supra note 17, at 577. I 
suggest this change in language was the result of compromise, or, at least, new thinking about the 
scope of the language ultimately chosen, quite apart from any general or abstract discussion of 
purpose untethered to the actual text. After all, the Framers could have simply copied the language 
already in the Articles of Confederation. Likewise, the contemporaneous (ratifying) public would 
(or, at least, could) have seen that the Constitution’s language departed from the extant language 
in the Articles. See supra note 33 (discussing technical meaning). The change in language here is 
not hidden; it is quite obvious.  
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such circumstances, abstract purpose will tend to push the interpreter 
beyond the intended and public meaning of the language. I believe this is 
what has happened here. On the other hand, once one concedes that 
presidential electors do not hold office under the United States, then the 
Legal Historians’ entire intellectual house of cards no longer appears quite 
safe and satisfactory. This is not to say that their position is flat out wrong, 
but only that their point of view, like any point of view lacking a firm basis 
in Supreme Court and other federal court case law, must be supported by 




 35. See, e.g., Jed Shugerman, George Washington’s Secret Land Deal Actually Strengthens 
CREW’s Emoluments Claim, TAKE CARE (June 2, 2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog/george-
washington-s-secret-land-deal-actually-strengthens-crew-s-emoluments-claim [hereinafter George 
Washington’s Secret Land Deal Actually Strengthens CREW’s Emoluments Claim] (“If Tillman 
thinks no one ever has ‘impugned’ [President] Washington’s land deal [where Washington 
purchased government-owned land in a public auction in 1793 in the new federal capital], 
[Tillman] may want to update that sentence: I’ve seen other commentators question Washington’s 
deal as improper, and I’ll impugn that deal here.” (emphasis added)). As far as I know, over the 
course of the last year since Professor Shugerman wrote this post on Take Care blog, he has failed 
to come forward with any publication by any other commentator who has impugned Washington’s 
conduct in regard to the 1793 land auction. Shugerman’s own willingness to do so, i.e., to impugn 
President Washington’s conduct, while he (Professor Shugerman) is actively involved in high-
stakes litigation against President Trump, and so not properly behind the veil of ignorance, is not 
quite the sort of unbiased expert evidence the fair-minded naturally turns to. See also, e.g., Rao & 
Shugerman, supra note 8 (asserting, while behind the veil of ignorance, that “[i]n every 
subsequent report of the Treasury Department listing the employees and offices ‘under the United 
States’—[including those] from Treasury Secretary Hamilton himself . . . —the president is 
included . . . .” but not producing, quoting, or citing, directly or indirectly, any such document, 
although a year has passed (emphasis added)). Compare Gorod, supra note 11 (writing, while 
behind the veil of ignorance, “[s]o it’s important to know everything Hamilton did, in fact, say—
including that George Washington was a person holding an ‘office[] under the United States’” 
(emphasis added)), with Adam Liptak, ‘Lonely Scholar With Unusual Ideas’ Defends Trump, 
Igniting Legal Storm, THE NY TIMES, Sept. 25, 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/25/us/politics/trump-emoluments-clause-alexander-
hamilton.html?mtrref=undefined (quoting Gorod, who stated, after she was no longer behind the 
veil of ignorance, the provenance of the Hamilton documents is “ultimately immaterial” 
(emphasis added)); compare Rao & Shugerman, supra note 8 (writing, while behind the veil of 
ignorance, “[u]ltimately, the central piece of documentary evidence [Tillman points to] for this 
emoluments argument is a manuscript version of a 1792 [sic] document by Secretary of the 
Treasury Alexander Hamilton” (emphasis added)), with Jed Shugerman & Josh Blackman (with 
Jeff Rosen as moderator), The Emoluments Clause in Court, NATIONAL CONSTITUTION CENTER 
(Oct. 26, 2017), https://player.fm/series/we-the-people-69963/the-emoluments-clause-in-court 
(Professor Jed Shugerman, stating, after no longer behind the veil of ignorance, in regard to gifts 
given to early Presidents, “[Tillman and Blackman] put a lot of eggs into this particular basket”) 
(at 12:24ff); compare, e.g., Shugerman, George Washington’s Secret Land Deal Actually 
Strengthens CREW’s Emoluments Claim, supra (characterizing Washington’s 1793 land 
purchases as a “secret”), Shugerman & Blackman, The Emoluments Clause in Court, supra 
(Shugerman asserting that the auction “was not publicized”) (at 33:55ff), and Gautham Rao 
(@gauthamrao), TWITTER (May 29, 2017, 7:04 PM), 
https://twitter.com/gauthamrao/status/869373840303980545 [https://perma.cc/Z3G7-YASL] 
(“One might also [critique] the ahistorical nature of Tillman’s ‘public’ fwiw[.]”) (reporting a 
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III. THE AFTERMATH OF THE HAMILTON DOCUMENTS IMBROGLIO: MIKE 
STERN’S “NATIONAL TREASURE ORIGINALISM” 
My amicus brief in CREW v. Trump stated: 
In 1792, the Senate directed President Washington’s Secretary of the 
Treasury, Hamilton, to draft a financial statement listing the 
“emoluments” of “every person holding any civil office or 
employment under the United States.”
36
 The Foreign Emoluments 
Clause’s language is limited to offices of profit or trust under the 
United States. The broader language used in the Senate order, 
however, includes all offices under the United States, without the “of 
profit or trust” limitation. 
Hamilton took more than nine months to draft and submit a response, 
which spanned some ninety manuscript-sized pages. In it, he included 
appointed or administrative personnel in each of the three branches of 
the federal government, including the Legislative Branch (e.g., the 
Secretary of the Senate and Clerk of the House). But Hamilton did 
not include the President, Vice President, Senators, or 
Representatives. In other words, Hamilton did not include any elected 
positions in any branch. Like [President] Washington’s acceptance of 
[Ambassador] Ternant’s gift of the framed portrait of Louis XVI, the 
Hamilton document is another probative Executive Branch 
 
“like” from Professor Shugerman), with John M. Gantt, City of Washington. January 7, 1793, 
67(IV) GAZETTE OF THE UNITED STATES (Philadelphia), Jan. 19, 1793, at 267 (“A number of Lots 
in this City will be offered for sale at auction . . . .” (emphasis added)). On the other hand, if 
Shugerman’s statement here—impugning Washington’s 1793 land purchases at a public auction—
were something he stood ready to support by referencing independent historians (writing in a non-
litigation context) or something he had published long before he turned his mind to litigation 
against President Trump or even if it were a natural extension of such prior publications, then his 
statement would carry more weight than it does now. See, e.g., Mikhail, Our Correction and 
Apology to Professor Tillman, supra note 11 (“We appreciate [Tillman’s] long-standing position 
on how to interpret the Constitution’s reference to ‘Office of Profit or Trust under [the United 
States],’ regardless of who is holding the office of President . . . .” (emphasis added)). I am 
hopeful that Professors Shugerman, Rao, and their Legal Historian colleagues (as well as others) 
will engage us all on these points in the not too distant future. See Mikhail, Our Correction and 
Apology to Professor Tillman, supra note 11 (“We look forward to continuing to engage the many 
important historical questions raised by this lawsuit.”); Shugerman, An Apology to Tillman and 
Blackman, supra note 11 (“There is much more to the arguments about the [Foreign and 
Domestic] Emoluments Clauses, and I look forward to engaging [Tillman and Blackman] in future 
briefs.”). Of course, as websites in the trial court record are allowed to deteriorate, the process of 
engagement becomes more difficult for us all. See generally supra note 11 (discussing the Legal 
Historians’ website of archived Hamilton-related documents, a website which is no longer active, 
although it was cited in their Southern District of New York amicus brief); Tillman, A Work in 
Progress, supra note 1.  
 36. Motion and Brief for Scholar Seth Barrett Tillman as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Defendant at 18 n.75, Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 
174 (June 16, 2017), ECF No. 37, 2017 WL 2692500 [hereinafter Tillman, Motion and Brief 
Against CREW] (citing S. JOURNAL, 2nd Cong., 2nd Sess. 441 (May 7, 1792)). 
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construction of the Constitution’s office under the United States-
language, which was established during Washington’s first term (and 
so contemporaneous with the ratification of the Constitution). This 
official and meticulous correspondence is not consistent with 
Plaintiffs’ claim that the Foreign Emoluments Clause’s “office . . . 
under the United States” language encompasses the presidency.
37
 
The intellectual claims reflected in the passage above were entirely 
consistent with arguments I had made in my publications, including in, 
among others, a peer reviewed publication and a conference paper, over the 
course of many years of active publishing—all long before President Trump 
announced his candidacy and became President. 
I also discussed the provenance of the Hamilton-signed original in my 
brief. This too is something I had discussed in my prior publications. I 
pointed out that the original Hamilton document is housed in the national 
archives,
38
 and a (partial) reproduction appears in The Papers of Alexander 
Hamilton.
39
 I also noted the existence of a second, less interesting 
document, a reproduction or scrivener’s copy of the Hamilton-signed 
original, which was not particularly relevant to the inquiry at hand. Why? 
Unlike the Hamilton-signed original, the second document was “not signed 
by Hamilton.”40 Unlike the Hamilton-signed original, the second document 
was “undated.”41 Finally, unlike the Hamilton-signed original, the second 
document was drafted by “an unknown Senate functionary.”42 This 
particular copy of the Hamilton-signed original was reported in American 
State Papers, and unlike the Hamilton-signed original, the copy included 
the President and Vice President.
43
 I posted copies (or partial copies) of 
both documents (which were in long hand) and both the typeset reports, 
appearing in The Papers of Alexander Hamilton and in American State 
Papers, on my Bepress website circa 2011—again, long before Donald J. 
Trump announced his candidacy.
44
 All these documents, along with other 
 
 37. Id. at 18–19 (emphases and bold in the original).  
 38. Id. at 19 n.76.  
 39. Id.  
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. Why the scrivener (or scriveners) changed the substantive contents in this manner is 
also something I have recently turned my attention to. See Seth Barrett Tillman, The Blue Book & 
the Foreign Emoluments Clause Cases Against the President: Old Questions Answered, NEW 
REFORM CLUB (Dec. 31, 2017, 6:10 AM), https://reformclub.blogspot.com/2017/12/the-blue-
book-foreign-emoluments-clause.html [hereinafter Tillman, The Blue Book & the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause Cases Against the President: Old Questions Answered].  
 44. See Seth Barrett Tillman, Selected Works of Seth Barrett Tillman, BEPRESS (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2018), https://works.bepress.com/seth_barrett_tillman/203/ (click files listed under 
“Related Files”). 
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interesting related documents, remain plainly visible and accessible to this 
day on my Bepress website. 
Five legal historians came to the conclusion—exactly how, even now, 
I do not understand
45—that the second document (i.e., the one reported in 
American State Papers) was a second original of some sort, Hamilton-
signed (like the original), and drafted contemporaneously with the original. 
Their push back, along with the pushback of others who joined them on 
social media, blogs, and podcasts, against my long-standing views 
regarding these two documents was quite astounding. Astounding in regard 
to the substantive position my opponents took, and also in regard to its 
intensity. 
I chose (in part by necessity dictated by factors beyond my personal 
control) to reply in a timely, orderly, and professional manner. I drafted an 
 
 45. A wide group of academics and litigators agreed with the five legal historians on 
Twitter, blogs, etc.—or, actively took the initiative to express similar views, before and after the 
five legal historians filed their brief. See, e.g., supra note 11 (collecting authority); Gorod, supra 
note 11 (“[A]fter months of pretending like this document didn’t exist, [Tillman] finally 
acknowledged it—and was forced to describe it in grossly misleading terms in order to discount 
its significance.” (emphases added)); Matz, supra note 11 (“It’s hardly an impressive defense to 
mislead so dramatically in the NYT but then say that it’s all okay, since a few years ago I had a 
footnote in a law review article alluding vaguely to this contrary material.” (emphasis added)); id. 
(adding that Tillman’s publications are “low-profile academic articles”); Norm Eisen 
(@normeisen), TWITTER (July 6, 2017, 7:28 AM), 
https://twitter.com/NormEisen/status/882969451557249025 [https://perma.cc/GBY3-HRK4] 
(“[D]evastating @BrianneGorod rebuttal of ‘evidence’ for fringe claim that emoluments clause 
doesn[’]t apply to POTUS” (emphasis added)); Glenda Gilmore (@GilmoreGlenda), TWITTER 
(Aug. 31, 2017, 4:53 AM), https://twitter.com/GilmoreGlenda/status/903224236843704320 
[https://perma.cc/53TX-VDJ5] (“Trump lawyers use 1 Hamilton letter for argument; bury 2nd 
Hamilton letter to the contrary written same day. Historians know better.” (emphasis added)); 
Laurence Tribe (@tribelaw), TWITTER (July 6, 2017, 8:00 AM), 
https://twitter.com/tribelaw/status/882977561986420736 [https://perma.cc/9PAF-BXDP] (“Read 
this devastating reply to the weird claim that Hamilton thought Presidents could accept Foreign 
Emoluments[.]” (emphasis added)); Laurence Tribe (@tribelaw), TWITTER (Aug. 1, 2017, 8:00 
AM), https://twitter.com/tribelaw/status/892381453312503808 [https://perma.cc/W8VR-W4XW] 
(“A National Archives visit obliterates @SethBTillman’s thesis that [President] DJT isn’t covered 
by the Foreign Emoluments Clause” (emphasis added)); Laurence Tribe (@tribelaw), TWITTER 
(Sept. 1, 2017, 7:20 PM), https://twitter.com/tribelaw/status/903804726717841409 
[https://perma.cc/GS65-VAYA] (“Another devastating critique of Tillmania by @jedshug[.]” 
(emphasis added)); see also, e.g., Jack Metzler (@SCOTUSPlaces), TWITTER (Aug. 31, 2017, 
8:29 AM), https://twitter.com/SCOTUSPlaces/status/903278565902491648 
[https://perma.cc/43YD-2LYS] (“Tillman uses the document repeatedly when it suits him, and 
then misrepresents it as ‘nearly identical’ when it refutes his central point.” (emphasis added)). 
Jack Metzler has since blocked Tillman from his Twitter feed. But cf. Milan Markovic 
(@profmarkovic), TWITTER (Sept. 19, 2017, 11:48 PM), 
https://twitter.com/ProfMarkovic/status/910395103134355456 [https://perma.cc/HXN4-KMMS] 
(“But, [because] of confirmation bias, I’d be surprised if your adversaries considered [the] 
possibility that Hamilton[’s] signature was fake[.]”). Just to be clear, my own view is that the 
signature on the Condensed Report was not a “fake;” it was a copy—from a time before 
photocopiers. 
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affidavit explaining my position in detail, and I supported my filing with 
declarations from five experts: two from leading experts in regard to 
authenticating eighteenth century American primary documents,
46
 and three 
from well-published Hamilton experts.
47
 The five Legal Historians did not 
respond with counter-declarations. Instead, they conceded my point—at 
least (or, better, only) in regard to my claims relating to the provenance of 
the two documents.
48
 I do not recount this singularly unhappy episode to 
embarrass the participants. I only do so in order that the reader can 
understand what came next. 
Mike Stern,
49
 on the Point of Order blog, wrote: 
 
 46. See Declaration of Professor Kenneth R. Bowling, Ph.D. (Exhibit H) at 3, Citizens for 
Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2017), ECF 
No. 85-9, 2017 WL 7964226; Declaration of John P. Kaminski (Exhibit G) at 3, Citizens for 
Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2017), ECF 
No. 85-8, 2017 WL 7964226. These declarations have been collected by Josh Blackman and Seth 
Barrett Tillman. See Josh Blackman, New Filings in the Emoluments Clause Litigation, JOSH 
BLACKMAN’S BLOG (Sept. 20, 2017), http://joshblackman.com/blog/2017/09/20/new-filings-in-
the-emoluments-clause-litigation/; Tillman, A Work in Progress, supra note 1.  
 47. See Declaration of Stephen F. Knott (Exhibit I) at 1–2, Citizens for Responsibility & 
Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2017), ECF No. 85-10, 2017 
WL 7964225; Declaration of Robert W.T. Martin (Exhibit J) at 1–3, Citizens for Responsibility & 
Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2017), ECF No. 85-11, 2017 
WL 7964229; Declaration of Michael E. Newton (Exhibit E) at 1–3, Citizens for Responsibility & 
Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2017), ECF No. 85-6, 2017 
WL 796420; Supplemental Declaration of Michael E. Newton (Exhibit F) at 1–3, Citizens for 
Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2017), ECF 
No. 85-7, 2017 WL 7964223. These declarations have been collected by Josh Blackman and Seth 
Barrett Tillman. See Josh Blackman, New Filings in the Emoluments Clause Litigation, supra note 
46; Tillman, A Work in Progress, supra note 1.  
 48. See supra notes 11, 46–47 (showing collection of sources discussing the Hamilton-
signed original, scrivener’s copy, and subsequent reproductions); Letter to Judge Daniels, supra 
note 11 (“Although amici do not believe footnote 82 bears on an issue which is disputed by the 
parties in this case, additional research and new information that has come to light since their brief 
was filed have led them to conclude that footnote 82 is mistaken . . . .”). After the five Legal 
Historians conceded that my position in regard to the provenance of the two documents (i.e., the 
Hamilton-signed original and the scrivener’s copy drafted circa 1833) was correct, the five Legal 
Historians neither affirmed nor denied, directly or indirectly, that I was correct in regard to the 
substantive issue. Id. Namely, the issue that the Hamilton-signed original is probative in regard to 
resolving the original public meaning of the Foreign Emoluments Clause’s Office-language. Id. 
What Judge Daniels, in the Southern District of New York, and other readers should have 
understood by the Legal Historians’ silence then and continued silence since remains puzzling. 
See Mikhail, Our Correction and Apology to Professor Tillman, supra note 11 (“We look forward 
to continuing to engage the many important historical questions raised by this lawsuit.”); 
Shugerman, An Apology to Tillman and Blackman, supra note 11 (“There is much more to the 
arguments about the [Foreign and Domestic] Emoluments Clauses, and I look forward to 
engaging [Tillman and Blackman] in future briefs.” (emphasis added)). 
 49. “Michael Stern specializes in legal issues affecting Congress, including congressional 
ethics, elections, investigations, and lobbying. He served as Senior Counsel to the U.S. House of 
Representatives from 1996 to 2004. He later served as Deputy Staff Director for Investigations for 
the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and Special Counsel to 
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Tillman responded to these charges [by the Legal Historians] by 
filing a proposed amicus response brief with a number of supporting 
exhibits, including declarations from five expert witnesses, two with 
expertise on authenticating founding-era documents and three with 
expertise on Alexander Hamilton. The evidence from these witnesses 
showed, to the satisfaction even of Tillman’s critics, that Hamilton 
signed only the Hamilton Report and not the version which listed the 
president and vice president. (That second version, which we will 
discuss later, was likely created in the 1830s, well after Hamilton’s 
death[.])[] In fact, the legal historians who had filed the brief 
criticizing Tillman issued a formal apology to him as well as a letter 
to the court withdrawing the footnote in which the criticism was 
made. 
At this point you may be thinking this is all very interesting (if 
you’ve read this far I will assume you are the sort of person who 
would find this interesting), but is this really the way we go about 
determining the meaning of a constitutional provision? An inference 
from omission that is said to cast light on the view of a single framer 
about the meaning of a phrase that is used in an entirely different 
context but is similar (though not identical) to a phrase used in the 
Constitution? And which then leads to a battle of forensic experts 
about whether the omission happened in the first place? Is this 




Stern made other arguments; some of which I have already responded 
to on my blog.
51
 Here, I only intend to respond to Stern’s points above. 
Stern says there was “a battle of forensic experts.” Not true. There 
were only experts on one side—then the other side conceded.52 This is 
 
the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.” Mike Stern, About, POINT OF ORDER: A 
DISCUSSION OF CONGRESSIONAL LEGAL ISSUES (last visited Feb. 27, 2018), 
http://www.pointoforder.com/about/. As a long time employee of Congress, one might expect that 
Stern has some facility for researching congressional documents and archives. See infra notes 59–
61, 63 (showing the various congressional documents which are publicly available, and material to 
the legal issues being discussed here). He certainly would have drawn our attention to relevant 
congressional documents—i.e., those about which he knew existed.  
 50. Mike Stern, Why Tillman’s Experts Show He is Wrong, POINT OF ORDER: A 
DISCUSSION OF CONGRESSIONAL LEGAL ISSUES (Oct. 22, 2017, 12:47 PM), 
http://www.pointoforder.com/2017/10/22/why-tillmans-experts-show-he-is-wrong/ (emphases 
added); see also, e.g., Tillman, The Blue Book & the Foreign Emoluments Clause Cases Against 
the President: Old Questions Answered, supra note 43. 
 51. See, e.g., Seth Barrett Tillman, You Do Understand That The 1793 (Complete) Report 
Was Not Hamilton’s Only Such Report, Right?—A Letter to Mike Stern & Point of Order Blog, 
NEW REFORM CLUB (Nov. 28, 2017, 5:35 AM), https://reformclub.blogspot.com/2017/11/you-do-
understand-that-1793-complete.html.  
 52. See, e.g., CREW v. Trump: Debate Over the Emoluments Clauses October 26, 2017 
Podcast Resource Materials, NATIONAL CONSTITUTION CENTER (last visited Mar. 26, 2018), 
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precisely how the legal system is supposed to work in regard to the 
production of evidence. This is not a bug; it is a feature. Indeed, the 
production of evidence by one party, leading to concession by the other 
party, is one of the main justifications for our summary judgment rules.
53
 
Stern says the Hamilton document is significant (if at all) because it 
“cast[s] light on the view of [only] a single framer about the meaning of a 
phrase.” Not true. The Hamilton document was part of an official 
communication from the Treasury Department to the Senate, and so, its 
contents cast light on the original public meaning of the document’s 
operative Office . . . under the United States-language. That meaning is 
further supported by the fact that Hamilton, the document’s primary 
signatory and author, was a lawyer, Framer, ratifier, and Cabinet member in 
Washington’s first administration. Thus, the Hamilton-signed original 
carries every bit as much weight as a modern memorandum from the 
Comptroller General or the Office of Legal Counsel. One might even say 
that it carries more weight. 
Stern says the language in the two documents is “similar.” The 
language is more than similar, it is identical as a practical matter. First, the 
language in the Constitution’s Foreign Emoluments Clause is “Office of 
Profit or Trust under [the United States];” the language in the Hamilton 
document is “civil office or employment under the United States.” The 
language in the latter does not include the “of profit or trust” limitation in 
the former, and so, the language in the Hamilton document has a 
(potentially) wider ambit than the language expressed in the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause. Second, the language in the Hamilton document 
includes both “office[s] . . . under the United States” and “employment[s] 
under the United States,” and so, the language in the Hamilton document 
has (again) a wider ambit than the language expressed in the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause. It is true that the Hamilton document’s language is 
limited to “civil” positions. But the civil/military distinction is irrelevant to 
our discussion: Hamilton’s list did not include any elected (federal or state) 
positions—it did not include the President, Vice President, Representatives, 
or Senators. These positions are civil positions, not military positions, and 
many contemporaneous documents (including documents emanating from 
Hamilton’s Treasury Department) reporting the “civil list” included all of 
these elected federal positions. Even Professors Rao and Shugerman 
 
https://constitutioncenter.org/media/files/CREW_v_Trump_update_podcast_resource.pdf 
(“Progressive scholars argued that other documents, excluded by Tillman, countered [Tillman’s] 
assertion—but review by historians and other experts revealed Tillman’s interpretation and 
identification of [the] documents to be correct—the progressive scholars were not citing to an 
original Hamilton letter but only a scrivener’s copy.”).  
 53. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56.  
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acknowledge this
54—so should Stern. It follows that if any elected federal 
position (e.g., the presidency) fell within the ambit of the Foreign 
Emolument Clause’s limited Office of Profit or Trust under [the United 
States] language, then there was good reason for that position to have been 
reported in Hamilton’s 1793 roll of officers because the operative language 
in the latter was clearly a superset of the more limited operative language in 
the former. The language is not “similar,” but identical as a practical matter. 
That takes us to Stern’s final objection: “Is [Tillman engaged in] 
original public meaning originalism or National Treasure originalism?” It 
seems to me that Stern could be making one of two arguments here. First, 
his complaint might be that something is methodologically unsound about 
examining core documents (i.e., “National Treasure[s]”) from American 
history when interpreting constitutional provisions. One can only surmise 
that such a restriction does not apply to the Constitution itself. If this is 
what Stern meant, it is hard to see the force of it. Judges and commentators 
have never refrained from finding meaning by exploring America’s rich 
Founding-era documentary heritage, even beyond the Constitution itself. 
American judicial opinions and scholarship frequently discuss the Articles 
of Confederation, the speeches and communications of Washington and his 
successors, etc., etc., etc. Of course, if we had on-point Supreme Court or 
other federal judicial precedents examining the Foreign Emoluments Clause 
or its Office-language, then there would be less reason to turn to non-
judicial extrinsic sources. But we have no such precedents, and in such 
 
 54. See Rao & Shugerman, supra note 8 (discussing the “civil list” and noting that it 
systematically included the President, under both Hamilton and his successors at the Treasury 
Department); see also Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 10 Op. Att’y 
Gen. 74, 79 (1861) (“[The President] is a civil magistrate, not a military chief . . . .”); 2 JOSEPH 
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 789, at 258 (Boston, 
Hilliard, Gray, and Co. 1833) (“The sense, in which the term [‘civil’] is used in the Constitution, 
seems to be in contradistinction to military . . . .”); Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, Is 
the Presidential Succession Law Constitutional?, 48 STAN. L. REV. 113, 114–15 (1995) (noting 
the Constitution’s “civil/military distinction”). But cf. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S 
UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 577 n.17 (2012) 
(“Under Article II, section 4 [the Impeachment Clause], only ‘civil Officers’ are impeachable. 
(Presidents and vice presidents are also mentioned separately in this clause, perhaps to blunt any 
argument that their role atop—or in the VP’s case, potentially atop—the military chain of 
command removes them from the category of ‘civil’ officers.)”). For Professor Amar to make his 
theory work, he has to convince the reader that the President and Vice President are in the 
“military” chain of command. But see Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 751 (1974) (“The military 
establishment is subject to the control of the civilian Commander in Chief and the civilian 
departmental heads under him, and its function is to carry out the policies made by those civilian 
superiors.” (emphases added)). Stern has an even more difficult road to travel. He has to convince 
himself and the reader that the President, Vice President, Senators, Representatives are all non-
civil, i.e., military, officers.  
TILLMAN STCL 2018 237-279_TILLMAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/10/2018  1:40 PM 
2017] WHERE THE BODIES ARE BURIED 259 
circumstances, where we are plainly outside the thicket of precedent,
55
 the 
use of extrinsic sources becomes methodologically necessary and proper. 
Given how little sense this interpretation of Stern’s position makes, I can 
only suppose that this was not Stern’s point. Stern was, I think, trying to 
make a different point. 
It seems that Stern’s objection is not that I turned to an early American 
document per se; rather, Stern’s complaint is that I turned to this 
purportedly peculiarly obscure document and/or the methodological use I 
made of this document was somehow idiosyncratic—beyond the customary 
methodological practices of our legal system. In other words, his complaint 
is not that I had engaged in “National Treasure originalism,” but that I had 
engaged in “National Treasure [Hunt] originalism.” 
Is the Hamilton document obscure? In the 1830s, the editors of 
American State Papers, the Clerk of the House and the Secretary of the 
Senate,
56
 had to collect and choose among tens of thousands of documents 
in Congress’s archives (and elsewhere) for reproduction in this multivolume 
collection. A great many documents were left out.
57
 Hamilton’s 1793 roll of 
officers was among those chosen. Nor has the Hamilton roll of officers 
gone unnoticed since. Even after two centuries, it has been cited within our 
corpus of modern academic articles and case law.
58
 That a document two 
generations after it is created is reported in a collection of America’s 
documentary heritage, and that two centuries after it is created, it continues 
to be cited by courts and commentators—these reasons seem to me, at least, 
to be some substantial evidence that this document cannot be fairly 
characterized as obscure. 
Was my (Tillman’s) methodological approach to the Hamilton 
document idiosyncratic? I don’t think so—here’s why. Four score and six 
 
 55. See, e.g., Josh Blackman, Back to the Future of Originalism, 16 CHAP. L. REV. 325, 
342–43 (2012) (“Perhaps the best examples in the first category are District of Columbia v. Heller 
and McDonald v. Chicago. In these cases, the Court was largely writing on a blank slate—
precedential open fields, as opposed to deep in the thicket. The Court was in no way bound by any 
sort of New Deal compromise, as the precedential slate was clear. Thus, the Court was free to 
receive, and did apply originalist arguments. In fact, both the majority and dissent in Heller and 
McDonald advanced originalist arguments.” (emphases in original) (footnotes omitted)).  
 56. See 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, at title page & vii (Clerk of the 
House of Representatives and Secretary of the Senate eds., Gales & Seaton 1833).  
 57. See Declaration of Seth Barrett Tillman (Exhibit D) in response to Amici Curiae by 
Certain Legal Historians at 18–20, Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 276 F. 
Supp. 3d 174 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2017), ECF No. 85-5, 2017 WL 7795997. 
 58. See, e.g., Tucker v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 135 T.C. 114, 124 n.8 (2010) (citing 
Hamilton’s 1793 roll of officers); Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The Founders’ Foreign Affairs 
Constitution: Improvising Among Empires, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 209, 215 n.49 (2008) (same); 
David Sloss, Judicial Foreign Policy: Lessons from the 1790s, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 145, 195 
n.263 (2008) (same).  
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years after the founding of the nation, during the Civil War, Congress 
passed a statute. The statute mandated that certain officeholders take a 
loyalty oath—this was a second oath, in addition to the ordinary oath 
prescribed by Congress pursuant to Article VI. The statute extended to 
“every person” holding “any office of honor or profit under the government 
of the United States.”59 The oath was passed during the Thirty-Seventh 
Congress. That Congress terminated on March 3, 1863. During that 
Congress, Senator James Asheton Bayard, Jr. (Delaware-Democrat) failed 
(or, perhaps, refused) to take the newly prescribed loyalty oath. Bayard was 
re-elected in 1863.
60
 When the first regular session of the new Congress 
met, Senator Charles Sumner (Massachusetts-Republican) put forward a 
resolution requiring all Senators to take the newly prescribed loyalty oath. 
Bayard refused to do so on a point of principle. Bayard contested the 
constitutionality of the statute (at least, as applied to members of Congress) 
and also its construction: i.e., Did the statute’s language reach members of 
Congress? Bayard made a variety of arguments. Bayard opened a copy of 
American State Papers, which was by then some three decades old, and on 
January 19, 1864, on the floor of the Senate, he proceeded to state: 
Early in the history of the country, on the 7th of May, 1792, an order 
was made by the Senate— 
“That the Secretary of the Treasury do lay before the Senate, at the 
next session of Congress, a statement of the salaries, fees, and 
emoluments for one year ending the 1st day of October next, stated 
quarterly, of every person holding any civil office or employment 
under the United States, except the judges . . . .” 
To that resolution, in February following, Alexander Hamilton made 
his return, and in that return of the persons holding civil offices under 
 
 59. See An Act to Prescribe an Oath of Office, and for Other Purposes, 37 Cong., 2d Sess., 
ch. 128, 12 Stat. 502 (July 2, 1862) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 3331). I do not adopt every 
aspect of Bayard’s position. See also, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 416 
(1819) (stating, in dicta, in a discussion about inferior Executive Branch officers, “[y]et he would 
be charged with insanity who should contend that the legislature might not superadd, to the oath 
directed by the constitution, such other oath of office as its wisdom might suggest”). Legal usage 
in regard to “office” and “officer” changed between 1776/1788 and 1861. After all, it was a span 
of more than eighty years. See Seth Barret Tillman, Either/Or: Professors Zephyr Rain Teachout 
and Akhil Reed Amar—Contradictions and Suggested Reconciliation 69–70 n.119 (Jan. 1, 2012), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1970909 (noting linguistic slippage between the Office-language in the 
Fourteenth Amendment and that used in the original Constitution); see also Jack Tsen-Ta Lee, The 
Text Through Time, 31 STATUTE L. REV. 217, 218 (2010). See generally John Randolph Tucker, 
General Amnesty, 126 N. AM. REV. 53, 54–56 (New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1878) (discussing 
scope of Office-language in the Fourteenth Amendment).  
 60. See Dates of Sessions of the Congress, UNITED STATES SENATE (last visited Mar. 26, 
2018), https://www.senate.gov/reference/Sessions/sessionDates.htm; BAYARD, James Asheton, 
Jr., (1799–1880), BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS (last visited 
Mar. 26, 2018), http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=B000248. 
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the United States . . . he included [administrative] officers of the 
Senate and [administrative] officers of the House of Representatives 
with their emoluments, but he did not include members of Congress. 
What, then, is the inference? Alexander Hamilton was certainly, as a 
jurist, as one familiar with the language of the Constitution, and with 
the mode in which it ought to be interpreted, a man whose opinions 
would be entitled to great weight; and in obeying an order of the 
Senate which required him to return the emoluments of all civil 
officers whatever, though he gave the officers of the Senate, the 
Secretary, all the clerks, the Doorkeeper, and also all the officers of 
the House of Representatives in the same way, he made no return of 
members of Congress, for the simple reason that they did not, in the 




Bayard was an honest man. Six days after Bayard made his speech, the 
debate on the resolution concluded. A vote was held. The resolution passed, 
and afterwards Bayard resigned in protest. Of course, because Bayard was 
working from Hamilton’s 1793 roll of officers as (mis)reported in American 
State Papers—Bayard believed the President was an “officer under the 
United States.” As a result, Bayard’s specific conclusions do not matter: 
what matters is his methodology.
62
 To put it another way, my methodology 
is the same as Bayard’s—I have used Hamilton’s 1793 roll of officers 
precisely as Bayard did—the only difference is that I had the advantage of 
having easy access to the Hamilton-signed original, to The Papers of 
Alexander Hamilton, to researchers at Columbia University’s Alexander 
Hamilton Papers Project, and to helpful archivists at the National Archives. 
By contrast, Bayard had to make do with what appeared in American State 
Papers. In short, my use of Hamilton’s 1793 roll of officers is consistent 
with what legal practitioners customarily do when construing undefined 
language. My use of the 1793 roll is consistent with what legal practitioners 
 
 61. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 31, 37 (1864) (statement of Sen. Bayard), 
http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llcg&fileName=067/llcg067.db&recNum=684. But 
see also Legal Historians Brief (NY), supra note 8, at 24 n.86 (“Tillman and Blackman ostensibly 
rely on originalist interpretation, but struggle to find original public meaning in overlooked and 
low-salience practices . . . .”).  
 62. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A 
New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 752 
(2009); see also, e.g., William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. 
L. REV. 1079, 1131 (2017); cf., e.g., Balkin, supra note 15 (rejecting originalism based on original 
“expectations”). See generally, e.g., JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, 
ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD CONSTITUTION (2013); William Baude (@WilliamBaude), 
TWITTER (Feb. 21, 2018, 9:51 AM), 
https://twitter.com/WilliamBaude/status/966369683367702529 [https://perma.cc/T4W2-CLGN] 
(“[Nourse’s paper] seems to badly misread @SethBTillman’s work[.]”). 
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have done even with this specific document. There was and is no treasure 
hunt; nothing I have done was idiosyncratic. 
I imagine that someone, somewhere will now say that Tillman is still 
wrong (they always do!), and Bayard was a crank. Let’s nip that argument 
in the bud before it too explodes on an unsuspecting and all too trusting 
public. Bayard was a lawyer, United States Attorney for Delaware, elected 
to the Senate three times, then resigned (on a point of principle connected to 
Hamilton’s 1793 roll of officers!), subsequently appointed to the Senate, 
and then again re-elected to the Senate. He was chairman of the Judiciary 
Committee in the Thirty-Fifth and Thirty-Sixth Congresses.
63
 He was the 
author of an antebellum treatise on the Constitution.
64
 His treatise continues 
to be cited by the Supreme Court and in modern scholarship.
65
 And, as far 
as I know, neither in 1864 nor any time since, has anyone criticized Bayard 
for engaging in “National Treasure” or “National Treasure Hunt” 
originalism. 
IV. PROFESSOR VICTORIA F. NOURSE AND THE ABYSS 
In 1995, Professors Akhil Amar and Vikram Amar wrote a highly 
influential article which appeared in Stanford Law Review. They argued that 
the Constitution’s varying terminology in regard to office and officer are all 
coextensive. In other words: “officer” (standing alone), “officer of the 
United States,” and “office under the United States” (and its variants) all 
mean the same thing.
66
 Their view is puzzling in three ways. First, different 
language raises a presumption or inference that different meanings were 
 
 63. See BAYARD, James Asheton, Jr., (1799–1880), supra note 60; History of the District of 
Delaware, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (last visited Mar. 26, 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-de/history. 
 64. See JAMES BAYARD, A BRIEF EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES (Philadelphia, Hogan & Thompson 1833).  
 65. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 981 (1991) (quoting BAYARD, supra 
note 64); John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Cruel,” 105 GEO. L.J. 441, 486 & n.263 
(2017) (same).  
 66. See, e.g., Amar & Amar, supra note 54, at 114–15 (“As a textual matter, each of these 
five [differing] formulations [involving ‘office’ and ‘officer’] seemingly describes the same 
stations (apart from the civil/military distinction)—the modifying terms ‘of,’ ‘under,’ and ‘under 
the Authority of’ are essentially synonymous.”); id. at 115 (“‘Officers’ of or under the United 
States thus means certain members of the executive and judicial branches, but not legislators—the 
legacy of an earlier view sharply distinguishing the ‘people’s’ representatives in Parliament from 
‘crown’ officers in executive and judicial positions.” (emphases added)). But see Akhil Reed 
Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1043, 1061 n.67 (1988) (“[I]t should be noted that if [Article V] Delegates can be considered 
‘officers of the United States’—and it is not implausible to view them as such . . . .”); but cf. Akhil 
Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1447 n.87 (1987) (suggesting 
“that congressional delegates [to the Articles Congress] were state [as opposed to federal] 
officers”). 
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intended and understood. Second, ascribing the same meaning to different 
constitutional text seems to cut against the authors’ reputations as 
textualists. Nevertheless, many other interpretivists, textualists, originalists, 
and others adopted their position.
67
 Their willingness to adopt the Amars’ 
position absent substantive discussion, argument, and evidence is equally 
puzzling. Third, the Constitution was drafted by, among others, able 
politicians and lawyers over several months. It was not a rushed job cobbled 
together by amateurs. Likewise, later drafts were scrutinized by the 
Philadelphia Convention’s Committee of Detail and Committee of Style. 
For example, the Committee of Style changed the draft Religious Test 
Clause’s “any office or public trust under the Authority of the United 
States” language to what became that clause’s final language: “any Office 
or public Trust under the United States.” Nevertheless, the committee left 
much of the other divergent Office-language in the draft Constitution 
unchanged. This and other similar examples are some evidence that fine 
textual distinctions regarding Office and Officer were meaningful circa 
1788.
68
 Certainly, neither committee made any efforts to standardize the 
 
 67. See, e.g., JOSHUA A. CHAFETZ, DEMOCRACY’S PRIVILEGED FEW 168 n.68 (2007); 
Steven G. Calabresi & Joan L. Larsen, One Person, One Office: Separation of Powers or 
Separation of Personnel?, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1063 (1994) (“The sentence structure [in 
the Incompatibility Clause], beginning with the key words ‘no person’ and moving on to the 
phrase ‘holding any Office under the United States,’ clearly indicates that ‘Officers of the United 
States’ are the suspect bad apples here.” (emphases added)); Kesavan, supra note 19, at 129 n.28 
(“The textual argument is incredibly straightforward: A ‘Person holding an Office of Trust or 
Profit under the United States’ holds an ‘Office . . . under the United States’ and is therefore an 
‘Officer of the United States.”’ (omission in original) (emphases added)); Vasan Kesavan & 
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 
GEO. L.J. 1113, 1208 (2003) (“There is good reason to believe that ‘officer’ in the Committee of 
Style draft [which is as it appears in the Constitution] is shorthand for ‘officer of the United 
States’ in the draft referred by the Framers to the Committee of Style, especially in the absence of 
any additional recorded debate on the point.”); Prakash, supra note 5, at 40 (“All federal officers 
[including the President], executive and judicial, occupy ‘offices under the United States’ and are 
‘officers of the United States.’”); Howard M. Wasserman, The Trouble with Shadow Government, 
52 EMORY L.J. 281, 288 (2003) (describing “Officers of the United States” and “Officers under 
the United States” as “synonymous terms” (emphases added)); cf. John F. Manning, Not Proved: 
Some Lingering Questions about Legislative Succession to the Presidency, 48 STAN. L. REV. 141, 
142 n.9 (1995) (“For convenience, I will refer to the many clauses that associate ‘Officer’ or 
‘Office’ with ‘United States’ under the rubric of ‘Officer of the United States.’”). 
 68. See PETER K. ROFES, THE RELIGION GUARANTEES: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 12 (2005) (noting that “[t]he Committee of Style rephrased the 
language by eliminating the words ‘the authority of’” from the draft Religious Test Clause). 
Likewise, the Committee of Style changed the draft Presidential Succession Clause’s “officer of 
the United States”-language to what became the clause’s final language: “officer” without 
modifiers. See Amar & Amar, supra note 54, at 116 (noting that “[a] later style committee deleted 
the words ‘of the United States’”); see also id. at 116 n.18 (noting “that the Committee of Style 
had authority to consolidate and clarify, but not to change, substantive provisions”). 
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Constitution’s divergent Office-language across the Constitution’s articles, 
sections, and clauses. 
Since 2008, I have written a number of articles on this question. I have 
flatly rejected the Amars’ position. My position is: office (standing alone) 
means one thing, officer of the United States means another thing, and 
office under the United States (and its close variants) means something else. 
Officer of the United States is the narrowest category. It extends to 
appointed officers in the Executive Branch and Judicial Branch. 
Office . . . under the United States (i.e., the language in the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause) is a wider category. This latter category (Office . . . 
under the United States) is a superset of the former category (Officer of the 
United States). Office under the United States extends to all positions 
created, regularized, or defeasible by federal statute, including nonelected 
Legislative Branch positions. The major difference between the two 
categories is that Officer of the United States only includes Judicial Branch 
and Executive Branch appointees (and, potentially, civil servants below 
appointees), but Office . . . under the United States also includes 
administrative personnel, i.e., appointed officers, in the Legislative Branch, 
such as the Clerk of the House and Secretary of the Senate. 
Office, standing alone without modifiers, is a yet wider category. This 
latter category (Office, standing alone without modifiers) is a superset of the 
former category (Office . . . under the United States). Office, standing alone 
without modifiers, includes all those holding Office under the United States 
as well as those holding certain elected positions: e.g., President, Vice 
President, and Speaker of the House (but not rank-and-file members). 
Furthermore, I have never argued that the Constitution’s text is 
determinate. I have consistently recognized that there are competing 
streams of good authority on these difficult textual questions. Given that the 
text is indeterminate, I have regularly turned to contemporaneous history, 
e.g., historical practice in the Federalist Era and Early Republic regarding 
diplomatic gifts to presidents, Hamilton’s roll of officers, and other 
contemporaneous and roughly contemporaneous extrinsic evidence. 
Although I recognize that there are competing streams of good authority, I 
have also written that some views are better than others, and that one 
position, i.e., the position explained above, is (in my opinion) the best. 
Professor Victoria F. Nourse published—during February 2018—an 
article on this topic. She discussed my prior research. She wrote: 
Consider the now-important battle over the otherwise ignored 
Foreign Emoluments Clause. The Constitution states: “no person 
holding any Office of Profit or Trust under [the United States], shall, 
without the Consent of the Congress, accept any present, Emolument, 
Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or 
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foreign State.” Long before this issue arose as a public question with 
regard to the current President, scholars had staked out positions on 
this matter. At least one constitutional textualist/originalist argued 
that the clause did not even apply to the President because the clause 
says “Office,” and based on a survey of the use of the term “office” 
throughout the Constitution, the term “office” typically applies to 
unelected members of the executive branch, not the President. He 
claimed that many other scholars, originalists and others, agreed with 
the position that “office” means the same thing throughout the 
Constitution. More recently, the President’s lawyers, claiming 
allegiance to original meaning, have asserted that, even if the clause 
does apply to the President, it only covers emoluments from 
“offices.” 
First, let us take the argument that the clause does not apply to the 
President. This is a classic form of textual gerrymandering—an 
argument that takes text out of context to create a new meaning. Let 
us assume that, in some parts of the Constitution, the term “office” 
means a lower ranking, unelected, member of the [E]xecutive 
[B]ranch. The problem comes in moving that definition from one part 
of the Constitution (call this the home clause) to another part (the 
receiving clause). Once isolated from the home clause, the term 
“office” is recontextualized within the receiving clause. If the home 
clause only covers unelected officials, then the receiving clause is 
now deemed to cover unelected officials. Such inferences, however, 
can rewrite the Constitution. The transferred home context effectively 
amends the new receiving context—the Foreign Emoluments 
Clause—by inserting the term “unelected.” Of course, that is not the 
actual text of the Constitution. The term “unelected” does not exist in 
the Foreign Emoluments Clause; it has been added by the interpreter. 
Under “analytic textualism,” one asks whether a pragmatic addition 
such as “unelected” is falsified by any other text in the Constitution. 
And, yes, there is powerful evidence that the President can be 
covered by the term “Office.” No one doubts that the President can 
be impeached. And so, no one should doubt that the term “Office” in 
the Foreign Emoluments Clause can easily be interpreted to cover an 
elected official like the President. Article II, Section 4 provides that 
the President “shall be removed from Office [on] Impeachment” for 
“high [C]rimes and Misdemeanors.” Article I, Section 3, Clause 7 
provides that the “Judgement in cases of Impeachment shall not 
extend further than to removal from Office.” This falsification 
procedure allows us to see that the claimed textual enrichment is not 
the “only possible” interpretation; in fact, it is not a terribly plausible 
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enrichment at all: even President Trump’s lawyers now admit that the 




 69. Victoria Nourse, Reclaiming the Constitutional Text from Originalism: The Case of 
Executive Power, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 26–28 (2018) (footnotes omitted), 
http://www.californialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/1Nourse-33.pdf; see also infra 
note 91 (discussing post-hardcopy publication changes to Professor Nourse’s article). The only 
Tillman-authored publication Nourse cites is my publication, Citizens United and the Scope of 
Professor Teachout’s Anti-Corruption Principle. Nourse, supra, at 27 nn.120–22 (citing Seth 
Barrett Tillman, Citizens United and the Scope of Professor Teachout’s Anti-Corruption 
Principle, 107 NW. L. REV. COLLOQUY 1 (2012)). I share Professor Nourse’s admiration for 
Professor Grewal’s and Professor Natelson’s recent papers on this subject. Nourse, supra, at 27 
n.121 (“For more recent and far more comprehensive claims about the Foreign and Domestic 
Emoluments Clauses, see A[mandeep] S. Grewal, The Foreign Emoluments Clause and the Chief 
Executive, 102 MINN. L. REV. [639 (2017)] [and] Robert G. Natelson, The Original Meaning of 
“Emoluments” in the Constitution, 52 GA. L. REV. [1 (2017)] . . . .”). If, however, Nourse had 
wanted a “more recent” Tillman-authored article, she could have turned to any number of my 
more recent publications. See, e.g., Seth Barrett Tillman, Business Transactions and President 
Trump’s “Emoluments” Problem, 40 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 759 (2017); Seth Barrett Tillman, 
Who Can Be President of the United States?: Candidate Hillary Clinton and the Problem of 
Statutory Qualifications, 5 BRIT. J. AMER. LEG. STUDIES 95 (2016); Tillman, Originalism & The 
Scope of the Constitution’s Disqualification Clause, supra note 28; Seth Barrett Tillman, Why 
Professor Lessig’s “Dependence Corruption” Is Not a Founding-Era Concept, 13 ELECTION L.J. 
336 (2014); Seth Barrett Tillman, Interpreting Precise Constitutional Text: The Argument for a 
“New” Interpretation of the Incompatibility Clause, the Removal & Disqualification Clause, and 
the Religious Test Clause–A Response to Professor Josh Chafetz’s Impeachment & Assassination, 
61 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 285 (2013); Tillman, The Original Public Meaning of the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause, supra note 6. Nourse could have also utilized my more recent, lesser 
publications on the same general subject. See, e.g., Teachout & Tillman, Common Interpretation, 
The Foreign Emoluments Clause, supra note 6; Tillman, Matters of Debate, The Foreign 
Emoluments Clause Reached Only Appointed Officers, supra note 6; Josh Blackman & Seth 
Barrett Tillman, Op.-Ed., The ‘Resistance’ vs. George Washington, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 2017, 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-resistance-vs-george-washington-1508105637; Josh Blackman 
& Seth Barrett Tillman, Op.-Ed., Yes, Trump Can Accept Gifts, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/13/opinion/trump-france-bastille-emoluments.html. Finally, 
Nourse could have turned to any of my recently filed amicus briefs in the three Foreign 
Emoluments Clause lawsuits. See, e.g., supra note n.† (collecting Tillman briefs); see also Josh 
Blackman, Defiance and Surrender, 59 S. TEX. L. REV. 157 (2018). 
Finally, notice that Professor Nourse ends her analysis with the assertion that President Trump’s 
lawyers “now admit” that the Foreign Emoluments Clause covers the President. Compare 
Nourse, supra at 28 (“[E]ven President Trump’s lawyers now admit that the Foreign Emoluments 
Clause does in fact cover the President.” (emphasis added)), with SHERI DILLON ET AL., MORGAN 
LEWIS LLP WHITE PAPER, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND THE PRESIDENT (Jan. 11, 
2017), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3280261/MLB-White-Paper-1-10-Pm.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B8BU-X4U3] (showing that the President’s personal lawyers took the position 
that the Foreign Emoluments Clause applies to the President and that this document was made 
public more than a full calendar year before Nourse published her paper). So why does Nourse 
write “now admit”? And why write “admit”? Is there any evidence that the President’s Morgan 
Lewis attorneys had first taken or considered taking a different position, but were pressed or 
consented to making the “admission” that the Foreign Emoluments Clause applies to the 
President? I have no good reason to believe that Morgan Lewis counsel considered the alternative, 
i.e., that the clause does not apply to the President. Moreover, Department of Justice counsel 
representing the President, in his official capacity, i.e., counsel who have submitted actual court 
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I trust the fair-minded reader and, in time, even Professor Nourse, will 
not object to my stating that Nourse does not actually understand my 
position in regard to the Constitution’s divergent Office-language. Because 
she does not understand it, she fails to characterize it fairly. Although I 
wholeheartedly agree with the textual falsification method put forward by 
Professor Nourse, she has not actually falsified anything I have argued. It 
might help the reader if I point out that at no point does Nourse ever quote 
any actual language from any of my publications where I take the positions 
which she incorrectly asserts are mine. 
First, Professor Nourse states that my view is that the term “Office,” as 
used in the Constitution, does not extend to the President. I have made no 
such claim. After all, such a position is a nonstarter: the Constitution 
squarely states the President holds an “office.”70 What could be more clear? 
Rather, my view is that the President does not hold an “office . . . under the 
United States.”71 
My position was aptly summarized by Professor Baude in a four-page 
article on Jotwell.
72
 In fact, Nourse cites Baude’s article.73 Just to avoid any 
confusion on these issues, Baude presented my views in a helpful chart. I 
reproduce the most relevant part of Baude’s chart.74 
 
filings, and who have written on this issue more recently than the President’s Morgan Lewis 
counsel, have made no such “admission.” Department of Justice Counsel have announced this 
more nuanced view both before and after Nourse published her academic 
article. Compare Defendant’s Supplemental Brief in Support of his Motion to Dismiss and in 
Response to the Briefs of Amici Curiae at 21, Blumenthal v. Trump, Civ. A. No. 1:17-cv-01154-
EGS (D.D.C. April 30, 2018), ECF No. 51, 2018 WL 2042235 (“For purposes of his motion to 
dismiss, the President has assumed that he is subject to the Foreign Emoluments Clause on the 
assumption that he holds an ‘Office of Profit or Trust’ within the meaning of the Clause.”) (filed 
after Nourse published her article in February 2018), and President of the United States’ 
Statement of Interest at 4 n.2, District of Columbia & Maryland v. Trump, No. 8:17-cv-01596-
PJM (D. Md. Mar. 26, 2018), ECF No. 100, 2018 WL 1511801 (“We assume for purposes of this 
Statement that the President is subject to the Foreign Emoluments Clause.”) (filed after Nourse 
published her article in February 2018), with Letter to Judge Daniels, supra note 11, at 1 (“[T]he 
government has not conceded that the President is subject to the Foreign Emoluments Clause.”) 
(filed on October 25, 2017, that is, before Nourse published her article in February 2018, but long 
after Morgan Lewis counsel had made their legal advice for the President public). It appears that 
Professor Nourse does not understand the prior filings, current posture, and the chronology of 
events in the three Emoluments Clauses cases.  
 70. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“He shall hold his Office during the Term of four 
Years . . . .”). 
 71. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. 
 72. See William Baude, Constitutional Officers: A Very Close Reading, JOTWELL (July 28, 
2016) (reviewing Tillman, Who Can Be President of the United States?: Candidate Hillary 
Clinton and the Problem of Statutory Qualifications, supra note 69; Tillman, Originalism & The 
Scope of the Constitution’s Disqualification Clause, supra note 28), 
https://conlaw.jotwell.com/constitutional-officers-a-very-close-reading/. 
 73. See Nourse, supra note 69, at 27 n.122 (citing Baude, supra note 72).  
 74. See Baude, supra note 72, at 3.  
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Second, Nourse states that my view is that the term “Office,” as 
used in the Constitution, “applies to unelected members of the executive 
branch.” I have made no such claim. My view is that Office and officer, 
standing alone without modifiers, include those holding office under the 
United States—i.e., appointed positions in all three branches—as well as 
those holding certain elected positions: e.g., President, Vice President, and 
Speaker of the House. (My view is that rank-and-file members of Congress, 
in the House and Senate, are not encompassed by the word “Office,” as 
used in the Constitution.) 
Third, after telling her readers that my position is that “Office” 
means the same throughout the Constitution, Nourse tells her readers that I 
claim to have found support for my position among other scholars who take 
the same position. This also is not correct. I report the position of the Amars 
and others to distinguish my position from their position. These other 
scholars have argued that the Constitution’s divergent Office-language is 
coextensive. I disagree with that position. My position is that divergent 
language accommodates different meanings. 
Fourth, Nourse states that “[t]his falsification procedure [which she 
puts forward] allows us to see that the claimed textual enrichment [put 
forward by Tillman] is not the ‘only possible’ interpretation . . . .” I ask: 
Why is “only possible” in quotation marks? Who is she quoting? Given that 
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the only scholarship she discusses in that section of her paper is my 
scholarship, the reader is likely to think I am being quoted. Nourse cites 
only a single Tillman-authored publication, and I do not use the quoted 
language anywhere in my article. 
For what it is worth, I do not believe that by interpreting the text of 
the Constitution, standing alone, one ought to conclude that there is only a 
single possible interpretation in regard to the Constitution’s divergent 
Office-language. In fact, I have repeatedly made a very different claim. In 
my Northwestern University Law Review article, which is my only 
publication actually cited by Nourse, I stated: 
I do not suggest that the Constitution’s text, drafting history, and 
ratification debates are free from all ambiguity on the meaning of 
Office . . . under the United States. Fortunately, we can turn to two 
incidents from President George Washington’s first Administration to 
understand the meaning of this somewhat opaque phrase.
75
 
My position is that where the constitutional text is ambiguous, one turns to 
early practice and history. I would add that the practices of President 
George Washington and his administration, and that of the First Congress 
are entitled to special consideration. My methodological outlook is hardly 
an outlier. 
Finally, Nourse concludes that my use of intratextualism (with its 
assumptions of coherence) is methodologically unsound, and that my 
conclusion in regard to the scope or reach of the Foreign Emoluments 
Clause is not “terribly plausible.” My response, beyond what I have written 
above, is that using intratextualism in this fashion predates my publications, 
predates original public meaning originalism, and even predates original 
intent originalism. It is far older. 
In his Commentaries on the Constitution, Justice Joseph Story 
wrote: 
[T]he [Impeachment] [C]lause of the [C]onstitution now under 
consideration, does not even affect to consider the[] [President and 
Vice President] officers of the United States. It says, “the [P]resident, 
[V]ice-[P]resident, and all civil officers (not all other civil officers) 
shall be removed,” &c. The language of the clause, therefore, would 
rather lead to the conclusion, that they were enumerated, as 
contradistinguished from, rather than as included in the description 
of, civil officers of the United States. Other clauses of the 
Constitution would seem to favour the same result; particularly the 
clause, respecting appointment of officers of the United States by the 
 
 75. See Tillman, Citizens United and the Scope of Professor Teachout’s Anti-Corruption 
Principle, supra note 69, at 14.  
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executive, who is to “commission all the officers of the United 
States;” and the 6th section of the first article which declares that “no 
person, holding any office under the United States, shall be a member 
of either house during his continuance in office; . . . .”
76
 
In short, Story concludes that the President is neither an officer of the 
United States nor holds an Office under the United States (which is a 
superset of the Foreign Emoluments Clause’s more limited Office of Profit 
or Trust under the United States-language). At the very least, Story thinks 
this position is plausible and supported by the text of the Constitution. 
Indeed, although not discussed by Story, the drafting history of the 
Impeachment Clause also confirms Story’s interpretation: an early draft of 
the Impeachment Clause applied to “other Civil officers of the U.S.,” but 
the “other” was dropped by the Committee of Style.77 Nor was Story 
alone—a fair number of later commentators followed Story’s lead.78 Nourse 
says (in effect that) Story’s view (a view with which I agree) is not 
 
 76. STORY, supra note 54, § 791, at 260. I hope this quotation from Story sinks in with the 
disbelieving reader. Story puts forward the position that the President is not covered by the 
Incompatibility Clause and its operative “Office under the United States” language. In other 
words, although the Incompatibility Clause precludes a Senator from serving in the cabinet, the 
text of the clause does not preclude a Senator from concurrently serving as President. If Story’s 
position, which defies modern separation of powers intuitions, is not implausible, my position in 
regard to the Foreign Emoluments Clause (i.e., that the clause’s Office . . . under the United 
States-language applies to appointed positions, not elected ones) is equally reasonable—even if it 
defies modern intuitions involving foreign policy and conflicts of interest.  
 77. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 545, 552, 600 (Max 
Farrand ed., 1911).  
 78. See, e.g., DAVID A. MCKNIGHT, THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES 346 
(Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1878) (“[I]t is obvious that . . . the President is not regarded 
as ‘an officer of, or under, the United States,’ but as one branch of ‘the Government.’” (emphases 
added)); see also Proceedings of the Sen. Sitting for the Trial of William W. Belknap, Late 
Secretary of War, on the Articles of Impeachment Exhibited by the H. of Rep., 44th Cong. 145 
(1876) (Senator Newton Booth, from California, stating, on May 27, 1876, “[T]he President is not 
an officer of the United States. As was tersely said by . . . Senator [Boutwell] from Massachusetts, 
. . . ‘He is a part of the Government.’” (citing STORY, supra note 54)); RUTH C. SILVA, 
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 135 (2d ed. 1968) (“The courts have been especially careful not to 
enlarge the meaning of the term ‘officer’ as used in the Constitution. They have defined an officer 
of the United States as a person appointed by the President and the Senate, by the President alone, 
by the courts of law, or by a department head.”) (collecting case law); RUTH C. SILVA, 
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION (1951) (“The courts have been especially careful not to enlarge the 
meaning of the term ‘officer’ as used in the Constitution. They have defined an officer of the 
United States as a person appointed by the President and the Senate, by the President alone, by the 
courts of law, or by a department head.”); Ruth C. Silva, The Presidential Succession Act of 1947, 
47 MICH. L. REV. 451, 475 (1949) (“‘Officers of the United States’ are appointed by the President 
and the Senate, by the President alone, by the department heads, or by the courts. Officers in the 
constitutional sense are not elected by the electoral colleges.” (emphasis added)). 
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plausible. But saying that it is implausible does not make it so,
79
 nor does 
her more strongly condemnatory language.
80
  
This is not the place for a full defense of my views regarding the 
Constitution’s divergent Office-language. That has been done several times 
elsewhere. Here, I will respond to Nourse’s charge that I have engaged in 
intellectual “gerrymandering.” What is meant by this charge? Nourse 
provides helpful examples. Article II, Section 1, Clause 1, the Executive 
Power Vesting Clause, states: “The executive power shall be vested in a 
President of the United States of America.” In reading this clause, Justice 
Scalia has stated: “this [language] does not mean some of the executive 
power, but all of the executive power.”81 Scalia, in effect, is changing the 
language of the clause to: “All the executive power shall be vested in a 
President of the United States of America.” Nourse challenges this type of 
textual enrichment as unsupported by the text. In other words, such 
enrichment is both reliant on unsupported assumptions of coherence across 
the Constitution’s text and reliant on unstated preferences of the 
interpreter.
82
 I agree. Nourse also objects to “intratextual arguments . . . that 
come from excising particular words from one ‘home’ clause and moving 
that enrichment to a different ‘receiving’ clause, where the term takes on a 
new meaning.”83 I agree with this too: such a strategy poses dangers. 
Consider the Impeachment Clause: “The President, Vice President 
and all Civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on 
Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high 
 
 79. See, e.g., Edward W. Bailey, Dean Pound and Administrative Law—Another View, 42 
COLUM. L. REV. 781, 802 (1942) (“The extent of [Professor Kenneth Culp Davis’s] 
accomplishment in that enterprise . . . is to demonstrate his own agility in avoiding contact with 
unpleasant facts.” (emphasis added)); Raoul Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness—A Reply to 
Professor Davis, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 783, 808 (1966) (“Professor Davis assumes that bare 
restatement of his position suffices to still criticism, and he stubbornly avoids the uncomfortable 
issues. But assertion ex cathedra cannot take the place of reasoned refutation, even when it comes 
from Professor Davis.” (footnote omitted)).  
 80. See, e.g., Nourse, supra note 69, at 40–41 (“[F]or example, the assumption that ‘office’ 
must mean the same thing throughout the Constitution leads to the verging-on-silly argument that 
the Foreign Emoluments Clause does not apply to the President.” (emphasis added)); see also 
Johnson, Episode 8: Article 1, Section 9, Clause 8, supra note 11 (Dean Erwin Chemerinsky 
stating that the position that the President is not covered by the Foreign Emoluments Clause is “a 
silly argument”) (at 32:25ff). Although I think that both the Dean and Professor are incorrect, and 
that both display an inability to thoughtfully comment on ideas with which they disagree (or fail to 
understand)—quite an unappetizing state of affairs for academics—between the two, Dean 
Chemerinsky and Professor Nourse, I strongly prefer the former. The Dean, at least, is saying 
exactly what he means. I suspect Nourse’s use of “verging” is not quite what she actually meant, 
and if it is what she meant, more is the pity.  
 81. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 705 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 82. See, e.g., Nourse, supra note 69, at 25 (complaining that “the interpreter is injecting the 
interpreter’s preferences into the text”); id. at 40 (rejecting “assumptions” about textual coherence 
across the constitutional text).  
 83. Id. at 40.  
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Crimes and Misdemeanors.”84 Now some read this clause as suggesting that 
the clause’s use of Office, standing alone, is equivalent to the clause’s 
“Officers of the United States” language. In other words, such interpreters 
engage in textual enrichment. Such people read the clause either as: 
The President, Vice President and all Civil Officers shall be removed 
from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, 
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors. 
or 
The President, Vice President and all Civil Officers of the United 
States, shall be removed from [the] Office of the United States [that 
they are holding] on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, 
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors. 
Others assumes redundancy—they assume that the latter “Officers of the 
United States” language also covers the presidency and vice presidency. 
They read the clause as: 
All Civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office 
on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other 
high Crimes and Misdemeanors. 
or 
The President, Vice President and all other Civil Officers of the 
United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and 
Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors. 
All this textual enrichment—assuming Office is coextensive with Officer of 
the United States—and assuming Officers of the United States also 
encompasses the President and Vice President—relies on just the sort of 
assumptions and inferences Nourse objects to. So do I. The meanings above 
are textually possible. It is also textually possible, as Story has stated, that 
the President and Vice President hold “office,” but they are not 
encompassed by the category of “Officers of the United States” or “Civil 
Officers of the United States.” The clause-bound text does not answer this 
question. 
Let’s look at another clause: the Elector Incompatibility Clause. It 
states: “[N]o Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of 
Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.”85 
Some think the clause uses redundant language. They think the clause 
means: “[N]o Senator or Representative, or Person holding any other Office 
of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.” In 
other words, they think the clause’s “Office of Trust or Profit under the 
 
 84. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (emphases added).  
 85. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (emphasis added).  
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United States” language extends to Senators and Representatives. To put it 
another way, the positions of Senator and Representative need not have 
been separately listed as they were included by the clause’s Office-
language. By contrast, others, like the Amars, think the Constitution’s 
divergent Office-language does not extend to members of Congress. Is the 
clause’s language redundant? That question cannot be answered from the 
text of the Elector Incompatibility Clause (standing alone). There is a 
second question. Does the clause’s “Office of Trust or Profit under the 
United States” language extend to the President and Vice President? Here 
too, the text of the clause (standing alone) supplies no determinate answer. 
The fact that some elected federal positions were listed (Senators and 
Representatives), but not others (President and Vice President), might mean 
the latter positions are excluded from the scope of the clause. But such an 
inference is not obvious. 
Finally, there is the Foreign Emoluments Clause. Again, the clause 
states: 
[N]o Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under [the United 
States], shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any 
present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any 
King, Prince, or foreign State.
86
 
How does Nourse read the clause? 
The President, Vice President, and no Person holding any other 
Office of Profit or Trust under [the United States], shall, without the 
Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, 




Here, it is Nourse that is engaged in just the sort of pragmatic enrichment 
she decries in Justice Scalia (who, you will remember, added “all” to the 
Executive Power Vesting Clause). Talk about unsupported assumptions and 
unstated preferences! Not only does Nourse not recognize the clause’s 
 
 86. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (emphasis added).  
 87. The Constitution and its Foreign Emoluments Clause “must mean something.” Either 
the clause applies to the President or it does not. The choice is a binary one. See Amar & Amar, 
supra note 54, at 136–37 n.143 (“The Constitution must mean something—the best reading of the 
document either permits or bars legislative succession.”). Professor Nourse has stated that my 
position—i.e., the position that the Foreign Emoluments Clause does not apply the President—
“verg[es]-on-silly.” Nourse, supra note 69, at 40. It is a fair inference that Nourse’s position is that 
the clause does apply to the President. Her claim to the contrary, i.e., that she is not “demand[ing] 
a particular textual reading” of the clause, is one the reader must judge for herself. Id. at 28 n.128. 
I point out to the reader, should Nourse respond that she has no actual view in regard to the 
applicability of the Foreign Emoluments Clause to the presidency or that her view is that the 
clause is ambiguous, then it made little sense for her to call my position “silly.” A position can 
only be characterized as “silly” relative to its rivals. If my position is “silly,” then it follows 
Nourse has embraced a rival position, and there is only one such rival position. 
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ambiguity in regard to the presidency, she affirmatively states that the 
contrary reading (i.e., the reading which excludes the presidency—a post 
not expressly mentioned by the clause’s text—from the scope of the clause) 
is “verging-on-the-silly.”88 
Nourse’s sole defense of her interpretation of the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause—where she pragmatically enriches the text by adding 
language about the presidency—is that: “Article II, Section 4 provides that 
the President ‘shall be removed from Office by Impeachment’ for ‘high 
crimes and [m]isdemeanors.’ [Likewise,] Article I, Section 3, Clause 7 
provides that the ‘Judgment in cases of Impeachment shall not extend 
further than to removal from Office.’”89 Here too, Nourse is engaged in just 
the sort of weak intratextualism she decries in others. She assumes that 
“Office,” standing alone, in the Impeachment Clause, and “Office,” 
standing alone, in the Disqualification Clause are co-extensive or 
sufficiently similar with the Foreign Emoluments Clause’s “Office of Profit 
of Trust under [the United States]” language to make comparison, 
enrichment, or even falsification meaningful.
90
 I do not suggest that such a 
view is stupid; it is not. Others have held this view in the past. I do suggest 
that Nourse’s position is “not the ‘only possible’ interpretation.”91 The text 
 
 88. See, e.g., Nourse, supra note 69, at 40–41 (“[F]or example, the assumption that ‘office’ 
must mean the same thing throughout the Constitution leads to the verging-on-silly argument that 
the Foreign Emoluments Clause does not apply to the President.” (emphasis added)).  
 89. Nourse, supra note 69, at 28 (quoting the Impeachment Clause and the Disqualification 
Clause) (emphases added).  
 90. See Nourse, supra note 69, at 28 n.128 (“It is worth noting that by invoking this 
comparison, I am not repeating ‘borrowing’ errors. My claim is not that the impeachment clauses 
use the term ‘Office,’ therefore the term ‘Office’ in the Foreign Emoluments Clause must include 
the President. I am using that clause to negate a hypothesized interpretation, not to demand a 
particular textual reading.”). Just as intratextualism requires identical or sufficiently similar 
language across clauses, analytic textualism requires identical or sufficiently similar language 
across clauses to effect falsification. Nourse assumes the Constitution’s use of “office” (alone, and 
without modifiers) in the Impeachment Clause and the Constitution’s use of “office” (alone, and 
without modifiers) in the Disqualification Clause are sufficiently similar to the Foreign 
Emolument Clause’s Office of Profit or Trust under [the United States] language such that the two 
former uses falsify my proposed view of the meaning of the latter language. She offers no 
justification or defense for this intratextual assumption. Such supposed “similarit[ies] . . . need to 
be defended, not assumed.” Id. at 41. Notwithstanding all her protestations to the contrary, 
Nourse’s analytic textualism is ad idem with Professor Akhil Amar’s intratextualism. See id. at 40 
(“‘Analytic textualism’ makes no such assumption [about similar and dissimilar words and 
phrases in the Constitution], indeed it seeks to interrogate such assumptions, by attempting to 
falsify claimed similarity relationships.”). That is precisely why her only efforts to falsify my 
position make use of clauses using the word “office” (standing alone and without modifiers), or 
merely announce her interpretive intuitions in a conclusory fashion.  
 91. Nourse, supra note 69, at 28 (inner quotation marks do not expressly refer to any 
distinct source). After hardcopy publication of Professor Nourse’s article in California Law 
Review [hereinafter CLR], and in response to my critique and complaints, the student editors at 
CLR removed these quotation marks from extant electronic reproductions of Nourse’s article. 
Nonetheless, the student editors refused to publish any response by me in CLR or on CLR Online. 
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is not determinate. There are competing reasonable views. Given that 
competing reasonable views are consistent with the clause’s text, I have 
turned to historical practice in the Federalist Era and Early Republic 
regarding diplomatic gifts to presidents, the Hamilton document, and other 
contemporaneous and roughly contemporaneous extrinsic evidence. But the 
merits of that debate are beside the primary point. The primary point I am 
making here is that Nourse does not understand my position, and that in 
seeking to argue the contrary (i.e., contrary to the positon she imagines I 
have taken), she has engaged in just the sort of interpretive strategies that 
she says she opposes. 
Professor Nourse’s inability to understand and properly 
characterize a line of argument—i.e., Joseph Story’s line of argument, 
Story’s successors’ line of argument, my line of argument—does not breed 
confidence that she has actually grappled with and fairly considered the 
underlying legal materials, including the fairly small corpus of academic 
literature on the Foreign Emoluments Clause.
92
 For me that is a small loss; 
one I have experienced several times before. For her and her readers it is a 
greater loss, and for her students, colleagues, and wider legal academia—a 
mentor’s, colleague’s, and peer’s inability to deal with idiosyncratic ideas 
in an even-handed manner—that is a loss beyond calculation. 
V. THE WAY FORWARD 
As illustrated above, much of the discussion regarding the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause, the scope of its Office-language, and relevant textual, 
scholarly, and historical inquiry has been less than useful. I think there are 
several reasons why we have come to this unfortunate state of affairs. 
First, the commentators above (along with other commentators) 
believe their position carries a strong presumption of correctness (if not 
certitude), that it is my duty to displace that presumption, and that they will 
be the judges if I have carried that burden. Certainly, I have never agreed to 
such terms for this debate. Nor should I. The text of the Constitution does 
not expressly state that the Foreign Emoluments Clause applies to the 
 
Furthermore, I have received no assurances that an errata sheet will be published in any 
subsequent issue of CLR. Finally, I have no idea if these post-publication changes to Professor 
Nourse’s article were made with Professor Nourse’s approval, and I have received not one word 
of explanation from Professor Nourse in regard to all these strange goings-on.  
 92.  But see id. at 28 n.130 (“Nothing in this Article presumes to be a comprehensive review 
of the emoluments literature, which since the initial draft of this Article has grown exponentially.” 
(emphasis added)). The corpus of full-length articles on the Foreign Emoluments Clause and 
Domestic Emoluments Clause remains quite small, and a good many (if not most) of those articles 
deal primarily with standing and justiciability, as opposed to the meaning of “emoluments” and 
the scope of the Foreign Emoluments Clause’s Office-language. One wonders where lurks this 
“exponential” growth of articles about which Professor Nourse is speaking. 
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President. The text of the Constitution does not expressly define the scope 
of the Constitution’s “Office of Profit or Trust under [the United States]” 
language. The Supreme Court has had no occasion to address the scope of 
the clause or the meaning of the clause’s operative language, or even the 
scope of closely similar language in other clauses. As educated generalists 
who have only recently chosen to inject themselves into this debate, these 
commentators’ opinions should get a fair hearing. I would add: so should 
mine. And because what is involved here is a debate between opinions 
lacking firm judicial support, our divergent ideas (and we) meet as equals.
93
 
In regard to the actual lawsuits brought against the President, it behooves 
those who brought these lawsuits, supporting amici, and those offering 
them scholarly shelter to bear in mind that, as a general matter, in civil 




 93. See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF 
THE CONSTITUTION 10 (1996) (rewriting the words of Chief Justice Marshall, and stating 
“historians can never forget that it is a debate they are interpreting”), 
https://www.amazon.com/Original-Meanings-Politics-Making-Constitution/dp/0679781218; 
Declaration of Professor Bowling, supra note 46, at 4 (“In Hamilton’s day . . . . Office under the 
United States did not extend to elected officials. In my professional judgment, Hamilton’s roll of 
officers, The Complete Report, is consistent with what was one strand . . . of the contemporaneous 
. . . public understanding of office under the United States.”). Professor Rakove has cited 
Professor Bowling and his publications favorably in the past—but not here in the context of the 
Emoluments Clauses litigation. See, e.g., THE ANNOTATED U.S. CONSTITUTION AND 
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 348 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 2009) (citing Bowling); JACK N. 
RAKOVE, DECLARING RIGHTS: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 204 (1998) (same); Jack N. 
Rakove, The Second Amendment: The Highest Stage of Originalism, 76 CHI. KENT L. REV. 103, 
105–06 n.12 (2000) (same). Rakove’s amicus co-authors agree. See, e.g., GAUTHAM RAO, 
NATIONAL DUTIES: CUSTOM HOUSES AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN STATE 226 n.52, 227 
n.66 (2016) (same); John Mikhail, The Necessary and Proper Clauses, 102 GEO. L.J. 1045, 1059 
n.47 (2014) (same); Shugerman, An Apology to Tillman and Blackman, supra note 11 (citing 
Tillman’s experts, including Bowling, approvingly). See generally Legal Historians Brief (NY), 
supra note 8 (filed on behalf of Professors Rakove, Shugerman, Mikhail, Rao, and Stern); supra 
note 10 (listing the Legal Historians’ other amicus filings).  
 94. See Nourse, supra note 69, at 28 n.128 (asserting that Professor Nourse is not 
“demand[ing] a particular textual reading”). In my amicus brief in Blumenthal v. Trump, I wrote: 
“Plaintiffs cannot point to a single judicial decision holding that this language in the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause, or the similar phrase ‘Office . . . under the United States’ in other 
constitutional provisions, applies to the President.” See Brief for Scholar Seth Barrett Tillman & 
the Judicial Education Project as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendant at 2, Blumenthal v. Trump, 
No. 1:17-cv-01154 (D.D.C. Sept. 19, 2017), ECF No. 16-1, 2017 WL 4230605; id. at 22 (same). 
An amicus supporting plaintiffs responded: “Defendant [Tillman’s] Amicus [brief] ‘cannot point 
to a single judicial decision . . . holding that . . . the Foreign Emoluments Clause . . . [does not] 
appl[y] to the President.’” Brief of Separation of Powers Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Plaintiffs at 16–17 n.9, Blumenthal v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-01154-EGS (D.D.C. Nov. 2, 2017), 
ECF No. 25-1, 2017 WL 5513218 (quoting Tillman’s Blumenthal v. Trump amicus brief, supra). 
Efforts to turn my language on its head are not availing: the burden of proof, production, and 
persuasion lies with plaintiffs, not defendant. See also, e.g., Shugerman, Questions about the 
Emoluments Amicus Brief on Behalf of Trump UPDATED, supra note 11 (“No court has ever 
adopted [Tillman’s] interpretation [of the Foreign Emoluments Clause’s Office-language] . . . .”). 
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If the very best that plaintiffs can show is that their position is no better than 
mine, then that ends the judicial challenge. 
Second, it is time for my intellectual opponents to be fair.
95
 Claims 
that they have made that they know or now know to be incorrect should be 
withdrawn or revised. Claims that they have made asserting the existence of 
documentary support, should be promptly supported with actual 
documents—or else the claims should be withdrawn. If they have to go 
through this process repeatedly, they might ask themselves if their position 





Shugerman’s claim here is entirely correct—he just fails to note that no court has ever held the 
converse, i.e., that the Foreign Emoluments Clause’s Office-language applies to the President.  
 95. A good place for my opponents to start might be to refrain from making key admissions 
about contrary arguments in their footnotes. Such admissions belong in the main text, not one’s 
footnotes. See, e.g., Nourse, supra note 69, at 27 n.122 (“To be fair, Tillman also relies upon 
various historical claims . . . .”). Likewise, Professor Nourse reports claims I have made, but she 
fails to report limitations I have put on those claims in the very sentence in which I have made 
them. Compare id. (“According to Tillman, other scholars . . . embrace the position that ‘all 
office-related language means the same thing’ . . . .” (quoting Tillman, Citizens United and the 
Scope of Professor Teachout’s Anti-Corruption Principle, supra note 69, at 20 n.55)), with 
Tillman, Citizens United and the Scope of Professor Teachout’s Anti-Corruption Principle, supra 
note 69, at 20 n.55) (noting “[o]ther (living) commentators who have embraced this position that 
all office-related language means the same thing, or who have taken a position akin to it, include” 
(emphases omitted) (emphasis added)), and supra notes 66–67 (showing examples of others with 
positions similar to the stance that all office-related language means the same thing). Finally, 
when presenting my ideas to the reader, Professor Nourse announces in her main text that they are 
the ideas of some unnamed originalist. See Nourse, supra note 69, at 26–27 (“At least one 
constitutional textualist/originalist argued that the clause did not even apply to the President 
because . . . .”). She fails to put the reader on any notice that my reading is supported by Joseph 
Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution. See STORY, supra note 76, and accompanying text. 
This is not fair to the reader, and well-informed scholars (including those who disagree with my 
position) have avoided doing what Nourse has done here. See, e.g., Benjamin Cassady, “You’ve 
Got Your Crook, I’ve Got Mine”: Why the Disqualification Clause Doesn’t (Always) Disqualify, 
32 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 209, 291 nn.393, 395–96 (2014) (asserting that the President is covered 
by the Constitution’s officer of the United States-language, and then in regard to the contrary 
position, first citing Joseph Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution and then Tillman’s 
publications). Yet, we know that Nourse considers Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution 
good authority. Compare Nourse, supra note 69, at 43 n.198 (citing Story’s Commentaries on the 
Constitution), with id. at 27 (accusing other scholars of “gerrymandering”). Just as Nourse does, 
there are many legal academics who consider their own legal intuitions, and that of their modern 
peers, as evidence, without recognizing the contrary evidence in the form of the legal intuitions of 
others. See, e.g., Erik M. Jensen, The Foreign Emoluments Clause, 10 ELON L. REV. 73, 90 (2018) 
(“Come on (I have heard colleagues say), we really cannot be expected to think the President is 
not holding an office of profit or trust under the United States.”); see also, e.g., Josh Blackman & 
Dan Hemel, University of Chicago Federalist Society: Debate on the Emoluments Clauses (Apr. 
9, 2018) (Dan Hemel: “But those trained in analytic philosophy think that actually intuition is 
argument or that intuition is a source of data that leads to arguments . . . .”) (at 36:50ff), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=biN5nrQQLfw&t=824s.  
 96. Another way to think about this issue is that if you believe (as I do) that the arguments 
and objections launched by the commentators above (against the president-is-not-an-officer-
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Finally, it is time for my intellectual opponents to be forthcoming 
in regard to an improved debate and debate atmosphere—an atmosphere 
rooted in mutual respect and goodwill. If that future debate is going to be 
informative, might not I (or you, the reader) ask these commentators to do 
more than make a mere tactical claim: viz., the President falls under the 
aegis of the Foreign Emoluments Clause. Might not I (or you, the reader) 
ask these commentators to turn to the more challenging intellectual 
question: viz., What is the scope of the Foreign Emoluments Clause and its 
operative “Office of Profit or Trust under [the United States]” language? 
Some heavy intellectual lifting might be involved. Once they have defined 
that language, maybe they could, maybe they should, tell us if the clause 
extends to: (i) Senators, (ii) Representatives, (iii) presidential electors, (iv) 
federal jurors, (v) attorneys admitted to practice in federal courts, (vi) 
advisors to the President who lack individualized legal discretion to affect 
binding legal relations, (vii) state judges subject to mandamus orders by 
federal courts, (viii) elected territorial officials, (ix) territorial officers 
appointed by elected (nonjudicial) territorial officials, (x) enlisted federal 
military personnel, (xi) state militia officers called into national service by 
the President, (xii) federal civil servants, (xiii) federal contractors, (xiv) 
members of a national Article V convention, (xv) members of state 
ratifying conventions called pursuant to Article V, (xvi) American 
appointees to treaty-created offices (where the treaty is not domesticated by 
federal statute), (xvii) multistate compact officials, (xviii) qui tam plaintiffs 
asserting federal causes of action, (xix) holders of letters of marque and 
reprisal, (xx) trustees, directors, members, officers, employees, and other 
 
under-the-United-States view) have failed, as did similar prior efforts, then that is some good 
reason to accept the position that has withstood their objections. Compare, e.g., Prakash, supra 
note 5, at 38–39 (“[Tillman] asserts that although the Constitution provides that the President 
‘shall Commission all the Officers of the United States,’ Washington never commissioned himself 
or John Adams . . . . Unfortunately, [Tillman] offers no evidence to support any of these 
propositions, but merely asserts them as fact.” (footnotes omitted)), with Case of Brigham H. 
Roberts, H.R. REP. NO. 56-85, pt. 1, at 36 (1900) (“[T]he provision in the last paragraph of section 
3, of article 2, relating to the duties of the President, that he shall commission all the officers of 
the United States, does not mean that he is to commission members of Congress, [and] he is 
himself an officer, and he does not commission himself, nor does he commission the Vice 
President . . . .”). As Chief Justice McKean explained “It is in argument, in law, and in logic, as it 
is in nature (destructio unius, est generatio alterius) that the destruction of an objection, begets a 
proof.” Boyd’s Lessee v. Cowan, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 138, 141 (Penn. 1794). McKean, a proponent of 
the then proposed federal constitution, made the same argument at the Pennsylvania ratification 
convention. See 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: 
PENNSYLVANIA 542 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1993) (McKean, on December 10, 1787, 
stating: “It holds in argument as well as nature, that destructio unius est generatio alterius—the 
refutation of an argument begets a proof.”); see also 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 560 (1789) (Joseph 
Gales ed., 1834) (Congressman Fisher Ames, on June 18, 1789, stating: “I believe nearly as good 
conclusions may be drawn from the refutations of an argument as from any other proof. For it is 
well said, that destructio unius est generatio alterius.”). 
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agents of federally chartered trusts, corporations, and other private entities 
with legal personality, and (xxi) individuals affiliated with private entities 
created under state (or federal, or even foreign) law in which significant 
equity is held by the United States government. I do not ask this to satisfy 
idle curiosity. Rather, the commentators above believe they have a 
coherent, if not correct, intellectual position. But the only way for us to be 
confident that their position is coherent (or correct)—and also better than its 
rivals—is for them to communicate their position to the rest of us so that we 
can see how it plays out, not only in regard to the presidency, but in regard 
to other federal and state positions. And if they cannot do so, if they are 
unwilling to do so, is that not telling? 
 
